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BURSTING THE BUBBLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: CHEVRON, U.S.A., INC. V.
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.
The framers of the United States Constitution designed our government
to provide for a separation of powers. The Constitution thus gives Congress
the lawmaking power, which out of necessity Congress must often delegate
to administrative agencies.' Administrative agencies have no constituency.
Therefore, Congress safeguards its delegation of authority by providing for
judicial review of the agency's decisionmaking process. That review ensures
that the decision is consistent with congressional intent. Traditionally, courts
have provided a meaningful review of agency decisionmaking by searching
the agency's rulemaking record to determine whether the agency's decision
is rationally supported by the record. 2 After a recent Supreme Court decision,
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,3 however,
it appears that Congress is essentially delegating its lawmaking authority to
the President when it authorizes an agency to administer a vague statute.
Moreover, presidential intervention into the agency's decisionmaking may
render the decision unreviewable, thus failing to ensure that Congress's intent
is effectuated. 4
Congress has delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
the authority to make laws to protect the public's health from air pollution
and its effects, pursuant to the Clean Air Act.' One regulation promulgated
by the EPA provides for broad coverage of a permit program that was
designed by Congress to restrict economic growth in unhealthy air states,
unless that growth was accompanied by progress toward achieving clean air. 6
President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, however, and ordered agencies
to reevaluate their regulations in order to help ease the burden on industry
from excessive regulation.7 Pursuant to this order, the EPA changed its prior
regulation to significantly reduce the coverage of the permit program.'
Because of this change, Congress's intent to allow only limited and condi-
tional growth in unhealthy air states has been thwarted.9 When challenged
in Chevron, however, the Court found that this change was reasonable. 0
Moreover, the Court found that the EPA's reliance upon the President's
policy views was proper."
I. See infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
3. 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
4. See infra notes 37-38.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1982).
6. 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1980).
7. See infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
8. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,667 (1981).
9. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 181-203 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
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The Chevron decision raises several important questions. First, it is unclear
whether Congress can retain control over an administrative agency's delegated
lawmaking authority when the President decides to intervene. Similarly, the
extent to which the Court will allow the President to intervene is also
uncertain, especially when that intervention results in frustration of congres-
sional policies. Moreover, the safeguard that judicial review provides is now
in question. It may be that Chevron has reduced judicial review of agency
action, following presidential intervention, to a hollow formality.
BACKGROUND
Article I of the United States Constitution vests all lawmaking authority
in a politically accountable Congress.' 2 The "necessary and proper" clause' 3
of that article allows Congress to delegate some of this authority to the
unelected officials of administrative agencies.14 Because an administrative
agency lacks a constituency, ideally Congress is to make broad policy choices
and then design a statute aimed at guiding the agency towards effectuating
those policies. 5 Instead, Congress oftentimes delegates its policymaking
authority by enacting a "goals statute."'' 6 In contrast to a "rules statute,"
which specifies rules of conduct, a goals statute specifies the statute's goals
and then authorizes the administrative agency to develop rules of conduct
to further those goals.' 7 The goals statute forces the agency to make the
controversial choices avoided by Congress."'
12. U.S. CONST. art. I.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778-79 (1948); ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex.
Pac. R.R., 167 U.S. 479, 494 (1897); see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-17
(1978).
15. ICC v. Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. R.R., 167 U.S. 479, 494 (1897).
16. Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30
UCLA L. REv. 740, 751-55 (1983). David Schoenbrod, a former attorney for the Natural
Resources Defense Council, claims that the Clean Air Act is a "goals statute" because Congress
has delegated to the EPA the authority to make broad policy determinations to develop rules
of conduct under the Act. The Act requires the EPA, for example, to set national air standards,
categorize pollutants and list sources which will be subject to the Act's provisions, all under
the mandate of protecting the public's health. Congress, however, failed to give the EPA
guidance regarding the meaning of the Act's goal of protecting the public's health. The Act
merely requires the EPA to set standards that are "adequate" or "ample" for achieving this
goal, leaving the EPA to determine the meaning of these ambiguous guidelines. See id.
17. Id. at 783-89. A "rules statute" might require, for example, that cars are not to be
driven in Los Angeles during daylight hours. The corresponding goals statute might authorize
an agency to regulate vehicle emissions, with the aim of reducing emissions and improving air
quality. Both statutes are designed to achieve essentially the same results, but under the rules
statute, the goals serve as an interpretive guide. The goals specified in the goals statute, on the
other hand, serve as a mandate under which the agency must promulgate rules. See id. at 784.
18. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7470(1), (3) (1982). The Clean Air Act requires the EPA's
Administrator to use his or her judgment in protecting the public's health and welfare. Id. §
7470(1). This is to be done while balancing the conflicting policies of allowing economic growth
and preserving existing clean air. Id. § 7470(3). Inevitably, any compromise between the two
[Vol. 34:757
19851 CHEVRON v. NRDC
Administrative agencies, as previously mentioned, have no constituency
and often have been "captured" by the industry or interests of those they
regulate.19 In an attempt to avoid this problem, 20 Congress requires an agency
to develop public rulemaking records that explain the justifications for the
agency's decisions.2" To serve this purpose of open and visible rulemaking,
the record must contain articulated criticisms of the proposed action and the
agency's genuine reasons for rejecting those criticisms. 22 Furthermore, the
record must contain the facts and/or a reasoned analysis to support the
agency's final decision.23 Finally, the agency's rationale must not be merely
conclusory .24
In addition to the public rulemaking record requirement, agency decision-
making can be overseen in two ways. 25 First, the President can coordinate
and guide the regulatory process. 26 Article II of the United States Constitution
provides that the President shall appoint agency heads 27 and "faithfully
execute" the laws of the United States.2" Additionally, the President has the
policies will fail to satisfy either environmentalists, industry, or both. As one commentator
remarked, "environmentalists and developers agree that government regulatory agencies figure
costs and benefits incorrectly. Environmentalists argue that environmental protection is still being
undervalued. Developers contend that arbitrary and time-consuming regulatory requirements
add unnecessarily to the cost of doing business." Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the
Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1, 11 (1981).
19. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1267,
1269 (1981).
20. For an example of Congress's continuing attempts to keep agency action in public
view, see Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982). See generally Verkuil,
Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 943, 966-70 (1980) (discussing Congress's imposition of procedural requirements upon
administrative agencies in order to restrain White House control of agency policymaking).
21. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
22. See id. For an accurate and concise description of what a reviewing court must look
for in an agency's rulemaking record, see NRDC v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d
633, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nora. Vermont Yankee Power Corp.
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
23. See supra note 22.
24. See Electricity Consumers Resource Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
747 F.2d 1511, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (remanded agency regulation, finding it "almost wholly
conclusory, largely short-sighted and patently unpersuasive").
25. Until recently, a third method of oversight was available, the legislative veto. The
legislative veto was a device by which Congress could veto an agency decision with a one-house
vote. The Constitution, however, requires both houses' consent and the President's signature,
before a bill becomes a law. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Thus, the legislative veto was found
unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). See generally Neustadt, The
Administration's Regulatory Reform Program: An Overview, 32 AD. L. REV. 129, 147-48 (1980)
(discussing what the author perceives as serious dangers posed in the event of a proliferation
of legislative veto provisions).
26. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926); see Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1271.
27. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
28. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3. The United States Supreme Court has rarely discussed the
President's constitutional powers, however, it did so in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invalidated President Truman's order to seize the nation's steel
mills). See Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MIcH. L. REV. 193, 196 (1981).
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authority to require executive agencies to report to him.29 Although the
President cannot make the laws, the "faithfully execute" clause gives the
President the authority to issue orders to manage executive agencies30 in their
lawmaking function.',
In 1981, President Reagan took office and, consistent with his campaign
promise to deregulate, immediately issued Executive Order 12,291.32 The
purpose of this order is, among other things, to reduce regulatory burdens,
increase agency accountability, and provide for presidential intervention into
agency decisionmaking.33 This order, unprecedented in its scope and effect,
3 4
subjects agency regulations to complete review by a single agency,35 the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).3 6 This review occurs after the
public rulemaking record is closed. The OMB has the authority to alter the
regulations based on facts and influences outside of that record.3 7 Thus,
during the review the President or his staff may effectively determine the
29. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1.
30. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926).
3 1. See Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 196-97. Rosenberg argues that the President's authority
to require written reports falls short of providing the power to control the actions of those
reporting. Thus, he argues that the language in the Constitution generally suggests that the
President is to serve only in an oversight function. Id.
32. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
33. The preamble provides, in pertinent part, that the order is to "reduce the burdens of
existing and future regulations, increase agency accountability for regulatory actions, provide
for presidential oversight of the regulatory process, minimize duplication and conflict of
regulations, and insure well-reasoned regulations .... I Id.
34. For a comprehensive history of presidential intervention in agency rulemaking, see
ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY
RULEMAKING 8-15 (1983) (hereinafter cited as A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING],
and K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:40, at 147-50 (Supp. 1982), and Rosenberg,
supra note 28. For an overview of regulatory reform under President Carter, see Neustadt,
supra note 25.
35. Traditionally, an agency's regulations have been reviewed by the courts on the basis
of their relationship to the underlying statute. Under Reagan's order, a single agency, the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), reviews all agency regulations on the basis of their cost-
benefit analysis. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1287.
36. All executive agencies must prepare a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for each
major rule, prior to publication of both the proposed and final rule. Exec. Order No. 12,291
§ 3, 3 C.F.R. 128-29 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982). The RIA is a cost-benefit
analysis that the agency must submit to the Director of the OMB. See Exec. Order No. 12,291
§ 3(c)(1), 3 C.F.R. 128 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982). OMB may then request a
consultation with the agency concerning the proposed rule and may further delay publication
of the adopted rule until its review is completed and the agency has responded to its comments.
See Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3, 3 C.F.R. 128 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
37. While the agency is required to include the OMB's views and the agency's response to
those views in the rulemaking record, there is no requirement that the facts or policies influencing
the OMB's views be included in the record. See Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(0(2), 3 C.F.R.
130 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982). One commentator has asserted that the OMB's
views will most likely not be documented because much of its decisionmaking process will take
place in phone calls and informal meetings. "And, much as our society values openness, it
remains true that candor and the flexibility necessary for collaboration or compromise are most
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substance of a regulation through private influence. 8 The order also sub-
stantively affects regulations by requiring agencies to adopt regulations only
when the regulation's benefits outweigh its costs. 9 This across-the-board
requirement ignores the fact that Congress may have previously determined
that an agency is to give special weight to particular policies in developing
regulations.4 0 Instead, to become law, all regulations must survive the order's
cost-benefit analysis
n
.
4
The second means of oversight is through judicial review of agency
decisions. Article III of the Constitution gives jurisdiction over cases arising
under federal law to the federal courts.4 2 Pursuant to that article, Congress
has set forth the appropriate standard of review of agency decisionmaking
likely to flourish in the shade." Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 595 (1984); see also A GUIDE TO
FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING, supra note 34, at 170 (suggesting that undisclosed private
interests may be disguised as presidential suggestions and influences); K. DAVIS, supra note 34,
§ 6:40, at 152-54 (Supp. 1982) (the OMB can alter an agency regulation without the public
comment which is required in agency rulemaking, thus the OMB's failure to document facts
and views presented to it may leave a reviewing court with an agency record not actually
supporting the rule to be reviewed); Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 195 (noting that critics of
Order 12,291 expressed fears that private interest would be advanced during OMB review and
that the true reason that order required a cost-benefit analysis is merely to justify the deregulation
of private industry); Verkuil, supra note 20, at 950-51 (order possibly violates separation of
powers principle by directly reflecting through the executive branch the interests of private
industry to deregulate).
38. For an example of the White House as a conduit for private interests, see Verkuil,
supra note 20, at 951-52 (discussing Quarles-Flanigan incident).
39. See Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 128 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1982). Section 2(b) specifies that "[riegulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the
potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society." Exec.
Order No. 12,291 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 128 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982). For an
example of a cost-benefit analysis affecting the substance of agency rulemaking, see American
Textiles Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
40. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1971)
(Congress had already taken cost into account). Perhaps, as one commentator has suggested,
Congress will find it necessary to enact future statutes as rules statutes, rather than goals
statutes, to assure that the statutes underlying goals will be faithfully carried out. See Schoen-
brod, supra note 16, at 826-28. A statute authorizing an executive agency to make policy
determinations will effectively shift this policymaking authority to the President. See Rosenberg,
supra note 28, at 215; Comments of William Coleman, former Secretary of Transportation,
reprinted in Strauss, supra note 37, at 664-65.
Although the President is accountable to the public, former Secretary Coleman is wary of the
President's order. Presumably, it will not always be the President that provides input once an
agency regulation reaches the OMB. Often the President's political advisors will be delegated
the authority to guide the OMB in its balancing of policies. The danger in this delegation of
authority lies not only in the fact that the advisor is unelected, similar to unelected agency
officials, but that the advisor does not even possess the expertise of the agency official.
Comments of William Coleman, former Secretary of Transportation, reprinted in Strauss, supra
note 37, at 664-65.
41. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. 128 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1982).
42. U.S. CONST. art. II1, § 2, cl. 1.
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in the Administrative Procedure Act 43 and mirrored that standard in indi-
vidual statutes, including the Clean Air Act.14 This standard of review
requires reversal of an agency decision that is found to be "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law . '4
The Supreme Court has found that the arbitrary and capricious standard
requires a "searching and careful" inquiry into the agency's decision-
making process.4 6 This is where the agency's rulemaking record comes into
43. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). Under the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) scope
of review provisions, a reviewing court:
decide[s] all relevant questions of law, interpret[s] constitutional and statutory pro-
visions, and determine[s] the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall . ..hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.
Id.
Congress enacted the APA in 1946 to provide guidelines for agency rulemaking and judicial
review of that rulemaking. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), repealed and replaced by
Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982)). Since then, Congress has incorporated the APA's provisions into
specific statutes designed to be administered by executive agencies and, in many cases, has
expanded upon the APA's provisions within the subsequent statutes. See K. DAVIS, supra note
34, § 6:10, at 492-94 (2d ed. 1978) (comparing requirements under Clean Air Act with those
of APA).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (1982). Section 7607 provides that a reviewing court must
set aside agency action found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law." Id. Congress intended reviewing courts "to continue their
thorough, comprehensive review" of actions taken pursuant to the Clean Air Act. See H.R.
REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1977); see also National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627
F.2d 416, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (acknowledging Congress's intent and applying the "hard look"
approach).
45. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (1982). The Clean Air Act clearly provides that the APA is not applicable
to those agency actions subject to judicial review under § 7607 of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(d)(1) (1982).
46. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). The Supreme
Court first articulated the "searching and careful" approach to reviewing agency action, under
the arbitrary and capricious standard, in Overton Park. In that case, concerned citizens
challenged the Secretary of Transportation's decision to allocate federal funds for the construc-
tion of a highway through Overton Park. Id. at 406. The Supreme Court found that the lower
court had failed to carefully examine the Secretary's decision and so ordered the court to
reconsider its decision, keeping in mind that protection of public parks was an important goal
of the authorizing statute. Id. at 419-20.
The Court stated that informal agency actions were appropriately reviewed under the arbitrary
and capricious standard set forth in § 706(2)(A) of the APA. Id. at 413-14. The Supreme Court
subsequently applied the same arbitrary and capricious standard to review an agency's informal
action in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1978) (per curiam).
Commentators note that, although the Overton Park Court articulated the arbitrary and
capricious standard, the Court appeared to equate this with the "rational basis" and "clear
error of judgment" standards. See 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 34, § 29:5, at 353-54 (2d ed. 1984).
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play. 47 This inquiry, sometimes referred to as a "hard look" review, 48 does
not require a court to redo the agency's job. 49 A court does not determine
whether an agency's decision is correct, nor does the court impose additional
procedures on the agency's rulemaking process.' 0 Rather, under the "hard
look" approach, the court determines whether the record contains evidence
that the agency engaged in well-reasoned decisionmaking."1 Thus, in order
for review to be meaningful, the agency must sufficiently explain its reasoning
in the record.12 Of course the potentiality exists that a decision may be
affected substantively by influences outside the record, such as presidential
"prodding," and yet still have factual support in the record. 3 Although the
agency would have chosen differently absent the ex parte contact, the court
may never know that such contact occurred and thus cannot control the
problem . 4
While the arbitrary and capricious standard is a narrow one, the other two standards broaden
the scope of review. Perhaps the Court's blending of the standards was inadvertant, but
arguably the Court intended to add depth to the arbitrary and capricious standard. See id.;
Note, Judicial Review of Informal Administrative Rulemaking, 1984 DUKE L.J. 347, 351
[hereinafter cited as Note, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking]. In any event, agency
rulemakers might correctly pay notice to the message implicit in Overton Park, that a factual
record must be developed if a regulation is to survive a thorough review. See A GUtIE TO
FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING, supra note 34, at 222-23.
47. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
48. Judge Leventhal coined the term "hard look" to describe a court's review of agency
decisionmaking in Greater Boston Television Corp. Judge Leventhal stated that:
If satisfied that the agency had taken a hard look at the issue with the use of reasons
and standards, the court will uphold its findings, though of less than ideal clarity, if
the agency's path may reasonably be discerned, though of course the court must not
be left to guess as to the agency's findings or reasons.
Id. at 851. (footnotes omitted).
49. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (court engaged in exhaustive
review of emissions standards developed by the EPA only "to see if the result ma[dle sense,
and to assure that nothing unlawful or irrational ha[d] taken place").
50. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Read broadly,
Vermont Yankee prohibits courts from imposing judicially-created procedural requirements
upon an agency's decisionmaking process. Apparently Vermont Yankee was all bark and no
bite, however, because lower courts have continued to impose such procedures, treating them
as substantive considerations. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 384 (D.C.
Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court further narrowed the applicability of Vermont Yankee, in
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983), by
requiring an agency to consider a specific alternative in its decisionmaking. See infra note
64.
51. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36-37 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
52. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983);
Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Stewart, The Limits of Admin-
istrative Law, in THE COURTS: SEPARATION OF POWERS 75, 79 (1983).
53. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
54. Id.
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Nevertheless, a court does have the authority to review agency decisions
made pursuant to executive orders." The Supreme Court, in Motor Vehicles
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
recently applied the "hard look" approach to a review of an agency's decision
to deregulate in accordance with Reagan's Executive Order 12,291.56 In
State Farm, insurers challenged the National Highway Traffic and Safety
Administration's (NHTSA) rescission of its passive restraint standard. 7 Con-
sistent with Reagan's order to justify each regulation through a cost-benefit
analysis,"' the Secretary of Transportation rescinded the standard because
the costs of complying with the standard outweighed its safety benefits. 9
The Supreme Court held that NHTSA's decision to rescind was arbitrary
and capriciousi °
The Court stated as a general proposition that an existing rule was
55. See, e.g., Professional Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, 706 F.2d
1216, 1220-22 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (pursuant to Executive Order 12,291, change in hours-of-service
rules for truck drivers supported by rational justification); see also O'Reilly, Judicial Review
of Agency Deregulation: Alternatives and Problems for the Courts, 37 VAND. L. REv. 509
(1984) (suggests courts may subject deregulation efforts to a higher standard of review, with
an overview of challenged regulation changes pursuant to Reagan's order). But see Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
56. 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983). For an analysis of the State Farm decision, see Note, Judicial
Review of Informal Rulemaking, supra note 46, at 361-76.
57. 103 S. Ct. at 2865. The history of the passive restraint standard pertinent to this Note
began in June 1976. At that time, Secretary of Transportation William Coleman suspended the
existing passive restraint standard, see 41 Fed. Reg. 24,070 (1976), to avoid public opposition
to the admittedly feasible standard. The year 1977 brought a new Secretary of Transportation,
Brock Adams, and a new passive restraint standard. See 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289 (1977). The new
standard required the installation of either airbags or passive seatbelts in all new cars by 1984.
NHTSA noted the regulation's significant safety benefits and, as late as 1980, issued reports
on the benefits of both airbags and passive seatbelts. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2862.
58. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text. Although NHTSA's decision to dere-
gulate and its use of the cost-benefit analysis were consistent with Reagan's order, NHTSA did
not cite the order as a basis for the standard's rescission. See Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981).
59. President Reagan took office in 1981 and appointed Andrew Lewis as Secretary of
Transportation. Faced with economic problems in the automobile industry and consistent with
the President's order to reduce regulatory burdens, Secretary Lewis re-examined the standard
in February 1981. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text. NHTSA concluded this re-
examination by rescinding the standard in 1977. See 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981). NHTSA
explained that rescission was necessary because the cost of complying with the passive restraint
requirement outweighed its safety benefits. Id.
60. 103 S. Ct. at 2867-68, While the court of appeals had some difficulty determining
the appropriate standard of review, the State Farm Court stated without hesitation that the
arbitrary and capricious standard was the correct one. Id. at 2868. Petitioner Motor Vehicles
Manufacturers Association (MVMA) asserted, however, that NHTSA's rescission was close to
being nonreviewable. Id. at 2866. The MVMA claimed that NHTSA's decision to rescind was
equivalent to an agency's decision not to issue a rule. The Court dismissed this argument and
stated as a general proposition that an agency reversing its prior position by revoking a rule
must more thoroughly explain its reasoning than if the agency had merely failed to act initially.
Id.
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presumed to further congressional policies. 61 The Court noted that a revo-
cation of that rule therefore required a more thorough explanation from the
agency than if the agency had merely failed to issue the rule initially. 62
Moreover, the Court identified three situations in which a court is to find
an agency's decision arbitrary and capricious. 6 These situations arise when
the agency: (1) bases its decision on considerations other than those intended
by Congress; (2) overlooks a significant aspect of the problem; or (3) justifies
its decision with reasons contradictory to the evidence or completely im-
plausible.
64
The Court undertook its review of NHTSA's decisionmaking in light of
the policies underlying the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 6 The purpose of the
Act is to protect the public's safety. 66 The Court noted that the Act was
necessary because of industry's insufficient response to safety concerns in
the past; thus, the Act was technology-forcing in nature. 67
The Court also ordered NHTSA to reconsider its balancing of cost and
safety considerations, keeping in mind that the primary goal of the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act is safety. 68 This is significant in light of the fact that
Reagan's order would require an equal balancing of costs and benefits. 69
Arguably, the majority's position stands for the proposition that the order
to factor costs and benefits equally does not supercede the statute's mandate
that greater weight be given to the primary goal of the Act-safety.
Although the State Farm majority never directly addressed the issue of
61. Id. at 2868.
62. Id. While an agency may reconsider its rules and policies on a continuing basis, the
Court noted that "the forces of change do not always or necessarily point in the direction of
deregulation." Id.
63. Id. at 2867.
64. Id. at 2867-71. The court of appeals and a unanimous Supreme Court found that
NHTSA's reasoning was arbitrary and capricious because NHTSA had failed to consider an
airbags-only standard. Id. at 2868-71. The State Farm Court found that NHTSA should have
addressed that alternative and then provided reasons for its abandonment. Id. at 2869. The
MVMA argued that the Court incorrectly required NHTSA to follow specific procedures,
contrary to Vermont Yankee, by ordering NHTSA to consider an airbags-only alternative. Id.
at 2870. The State Farm Court disagreed with the MVMA's interpretation of Vermont Yankee,
however, and rejected the MVMA's interpretations of State Farm's order to reconsider. Id. at
2870-71. The State Farm Court, consistent with Vermont Yankee, had not imposed specific
procedures on the agency, nor required it to consider every policy choice. The Court only
required NHTSA to consider an existing technologically feasible alternative found in the
rescinded standard. Id. The Court ordered NHTSA to consider an airbags-only requirement
and to explain its decision if it chose not to retain the requirement. Id. at 2874.
65. Id. at 2873.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2870. The Court stated that "[i]f, under the statute, the agency should not defer
to the industry's failure to develop safer cars, which it surely should not do, a fortiori it may
not revoke a safety standard which can be satisfied by current technology simply because the
industry has opted for an ineffective seatbelt design." Id.
68. Id. at 2873.
69. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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presidential intervention into agency decisionmaking, 70 the dissenters clearly
stated that such intervention was proper. 7' Justice Rehnquist, joined in his
dissent by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice O'Connor, found
it reasonable for an agency to reevaluate the costs and benefits of its
regulations in light of a change in executive policies.72 Nevertheless, all nine
Justices endorsed the "hard look" approach to judicial review. 71
Just as review of an agency's decision to deregulate, consistent with an
executive order, did not change the scope of review, neither will review of
a technical regulation. 74 In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,7" the Natural Resources Defense Council challenged
a decision of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding the licensing of
nuclear power plants. 76 The Commission decided that licensing boards can
assume, for the purpose of every licensing determination, that the disposal
of certain nuclear wastes will have no significant impact on the environment.
77
Thus, the fact that nuclear wastes are to be permanently stored at the site
is not to affect the decision of whether to license the plant.
Noting the "acute" public awareness concerning the issue of nuclear
power, the Supreme Court began a careful review of the factors considered
by the agency in its decisionmaking process.7 ' After discussing the agency's
70. See 103 S. Ct. at 2873. The Court found that while an agency may change its policies,
its decision to change course must be reasonably explained. Id. The Court recognized that
NHTSA's rescission was an attempt to deregulate, but failed to cite the President's Executive
Order 12,291, as the possible reason. See id. at 2866.
71. Id. at 2875 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent clearly stated that "the agency's
changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new President from a
different political party." Id. at 2875 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Assuming congressional
mandates will not be overlooked, the dissenters found that an executive order provides a
reasonable explanation for an agency's re-examination of its regulations in light of a new cost-
benefit analysis. See id. at 2875 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also The Supreme Court, 1982
Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 230, 230-36 (1983) (suggests State Farm majority may have avoided
mention of the political nature of the rescission as a means of rejecting Reagan's policies).
72. 103 S. Ct. at 2875 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra note 71.
73. 103 S. Ct. at 2874.
74. See, e.g., Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n of Am. v. FERC, 716 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(challenge to new approach for measuring energy content of natural gas); Small Refiners Lead
Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (challenge to EPA regulations
setting standard for lead content in gasoline); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (challenge to EPA's regulations for controlling emissions from coal-fired power plants);
National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (challenge to EPA's new source
performance standards limiting emissions); see also Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking
and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974) (Judge Leventhal, of the District
of Columbia Circuit, distinguishes courts' review from that of performing the agency's job);
Note, An Evolving Model for Judicial Review of Environmental, Safety and Health Rulemaking:
Small Refiners Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 1027 (1984) (discusses
model developed by District of Columbia Circuit).
75. 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
76. Id. at 2250.
77. Id. at 2249.
78. Id. at 2252.
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findings, the Court concluded that these findings rationally supported the
agency's choice.7 9 Although the Court categorized this as a technical policy
decision, 80 it was still able to carefully review the process by which the agency
reached its decision and to find that decision reasonable. This depth of
review was not unique, and was consistent with the application by courts of
the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing equally technical decisions
under other complex statutes, such as the Clean Air Act."'
The Clean Air Act is a goals statute. 2 The primary goal of the Clean Air
Act is to protect the public's health.8 3 The Act places the responsibility for
achieving this goal on both the state and federal governments.14 Due to the
states' failure to adequately respond to the problem of air pollution, however,
Congress has increasingly placed greater reliance on the federal government
to ensure the states' compliance. 5
79. Id. at 2256-57.
80. Id. at 2257.
81. See cases cited supra note 74.
82. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. "The problem with statutes that broadly
delegate decisionmaking authority is that they leave key value choices to low visibility decision-
makers fearful of making controversial choices." Schoenbrod, supra note 16, at 753-54.
Schoenbrod asserts that the EPA designs rules, under the Clean Air Act, in such a way as to
avoid economic, technical and political objections. Thus, the EPA essentially manipulates and
redefines the Act's goals through its discretionary rulemaking. Id. at 767-79.
While a goals statute allows unelected officials, such as those within the EPA, to make broad
and sometimes compromising policy judgments, a rules approach to the Clean Air Act raises
objections as well. Congress lacks the time and expertise required to develop necessarily technical
rules. Additionally, the cumbersome legislative rulemaking process makes it difficult for Con-
gress to react quickly to new information. Arguably then, these factors require Congress to
delegate its rulemaking authority to an agency that can develop the necessary expertise and will
be able to react quickly and efficiently to new problems. Nevertheless, Schoenbrod asserts that
the same concerns that weigh against congressional rulemaking have become realities with the
EPA as rulemaker under the Act. Id. at 803-15. Accordingly, he concludes that rulemaking
under the Act should be left to Congress; the rulemaking body which is politically accountable.
Id.; see also D. CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION-FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS § 1.06 (1981) (discussing
arguments for and against delegating executive agencies rulemaking authority).
83. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1982)). The primary purpose of the Clean Air Act is "to protect and
enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare
and the productive capacity of its population." Id.
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c)(3), (4) (1982).
85. Although the problem of air pollution has plagued the nation for longer than 30
years, the first congressional recognition of the problem occurred in 1955 with passage of a
bill authorizing the federal government to provide research, technical, and financial assistance
to the states in an effort to combat the problem. Act of July 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 159, 69
Stat. 322. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare was charged with administering the
statute, although primary responsibility for developing air pollution control strategies was left
to the states. See Act of July 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 159, § 1, 69 Stat. 322, 322.
Growing concerns with the problems of air pollution, combined with the states' failure to act,
soon led Congress to amend the Act. See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat.
392. Accordingly, the purpose of this amendment was to improve, strengthen and accelerate
programs for the prevention and abatement of air pollution. See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub.
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Accordingly, the Act requires the EPA, the executive agency authorized
to administer the Act, 6 to develop two sets of national air standards. First,
the EPA develops air quality standards that specify the maximum concen-
tration of known pollutants that may safely be allowed in the air.8 7 These
standards set the goals that, when attained, will result in clean air. Second,
the EPA develops emission standards that specify the maximum rates at
L. No. 88-206, § 1, 77 Stat. 392, 392-93. The still timid nature of the Act was reflected,
however, in § 2(a), which merely provided for encouragement of cooperation between the states.
See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 2(a), 77 Stat. 392, 392.
Another attempt to provide more force to the Act, by actually increasing the federal role,
occurred in 1967. See Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485. The 1967
Act required the federal government to create air quality control regions, establish criteria for
health protection, and recommend control technology. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No.
90-148, § 107, 81 Stat. 485, 490-91. The Act required states to adopt air quality control
standards that were subject to federal review and approval. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-148, § 108(c)(1), 81 Stat. 485, 492.
Congress recognized the need for a federal agency to set national air quality standards in its
1970 amendments to the Act. See Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
Thus, by design, the establishment of the EPA coincided with the enactment of the 1970 Act.
See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970 § 2(a)(3), 3 C.F.R. 1072, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982).
Then, to provide the increased federal control, the Act required the newly-established EPA to,
among other things, publish a list of known air pollutants, issue air quality criteria for each
pollutant, set national air quality standards, review and approve state implementation plans,
and determine which pollutants were hazardous. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,
§§ 108-112, 84 Stat. 1676, 1678-86. The Act required the states to design plans to implement,
maintain, and enforce the standards set by the EPA. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
604, § I l0(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1676, 1680.
The Supreme Court recognized Congress's concern with the states' failure to act. In Union
Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976), the Court stated that "the [1970] Amendments reflect
congressional dissatisfaction with the progress of existing air pollution programs and a deter-
mination to 'tak[e] a stick to the States' in order to guarantee prompt attainment and main-
tenance of specified air quality standards." Id. at 249 (citation omitted). For a detailed history
of the Clean Air Act of 1970, see Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
86. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was originally authorized
to administer the Clean Air Act. After the EPA's establishment in July 1970, however, HEW's
functions pursuant to the Act were transferred to the new agency. See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of
1970 § 2 (a)(3), 3 C.F.R. 1072, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (1982). That section requires the EPA to publish a list of each
air pollutant:
(A) emissions of which, in [its] judgment cause or contribute to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare;
(B) the presence of which in the ambient air results from numerous or diverse mobile
or stationary sources; and
(C) for which air quality criteria had not been issued before the December 31, 1970,
but for which [it] plans to issue air quality criteria under this section.
Id. Section 7409 requires that following publication of this list, the EPA is to establish national
primary and secondary ambient air quality standards. Attainment of the primary standards will
protect the public health. Id. § 7409(b)(1). The secondary standards are necessary to protect
the public welfare. Id. § 7409(b)(2).
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which hazardous pollutants may safely be released into the air. 8 The emission
standards are used to achieve the air quality standards.8 9
The Act requires states to adopt implementation plans designed to meet
both sets of national standards. 90 Each plan must provide for the reduction
of existing emissions that exceed emission standards. 9' Furthermore, to pre-
vent new pollution problems, each plan must assure that emissions from new
and modified sources meet or fall below the emission standards. 92 Assuming
states would gradually reduce emissions, Congress envisioned the expedient
attainment of air quality standards. 9 Nevertheless, to force the states to
comply, the Act originally required the halt of further economic growth, by
way of a ban on construction, in those states failing to attain these stand-
88. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A) (1982). That section requires the EPA's Administrator to
publish a list of all hazardous pollutants "for which he intends to establish an emission
standard." Id. Section 7412(b)(l)(B) requires the Administrator to establish an emission standard
for each hazardous pollutant "at the level which in his judgment provides an ample margin of
safety to protect the public health from such hazardous air pollutants." Id. § 7412(b)(l)(B).
Section 7412(a)(1) defines a "hazardous air pollutant" as "an air pollutant to which no ambient
air quality standard is applicable and which in the judgment of the Administrator causes, or
contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to result in, an increase in
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness." Id. §
7412(a)(1).
89. Both sets of standards, however, are easily manipulated by where, when, and how
they are applied. See L. LAVE & G. OMENN, CLEARING THE AIR: REFORMING THE CLEAN AIR
ACT 7 (1981).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982). That section requires states to submit implementation plans
to the EPA for approval, Id. These plans must include provisions for: attainment of air quality
standards within a specified time period; compliance with applicable emissions standards; review
of proposed construction; and assurance that the state's emissions will not interfere with other
states' progress toward attainment. Id. Although the Act requires states to comply within three
years of the plan's adoption, several methods are provided for extending this deadline. See id.
The Act gives states nine months, following the promulgation of any national air quality
standard, to adopt and submit to the Administrator, a plan for attaining that standard. Id. §
7410(a)(1). Section 7410(a)(2)(A) requires attainment of the standards within three years from
the plan's approval date. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A). This deadline may be extended, however, as
follows: § 7410(b) allows the Administrator, in his discretion, to grant up to an eighteen month
extension for a state's submission of the plan, id. § 7410(b); and § 7410(e) provides for up to
a two-year extension if the necessary technology is unavailable, id. § 7410(e). Previously §
7410(f)(1) allowed for the postponement of the deadline with respect to a source (or class of
sources) if "good faith efforts have been made to comply." See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f)(1) (1976).
Subsection 7410(f) was omitted in the 1977 amendment to the Act and a substitute subsection
inserted that relates to national and regional energy emergencies. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(0 (1982).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1)(B) (1982).
92. Id. § 7412(c)(l)(A). That section permits the construction of "any new source or [the]
modiffication of] any existing source which in the Administrator's judgment . . . will not cause
emissions in violation of such [emission] standard." Id. Additionally, § 7412(d)(1) requires each
state to design an implementation plan for "implementing and enforcing" these standards
established pursuant to § 7412(c)(1)(A) and § 7412(c)(1)(B). Id. § 7412(d)(1).
93. See L. LAVE & G. OMENN, supra note 89, at 8.
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ards. 94 Unfortunately, many states, despite extensions, were unable to attain
these standards by the deadlines established under the 1970 Act. 95
A significant cause of states' nonattainment under the 1970 Act resulted
from Congress's failure to recognize a major weakness of the Act. 96 While
the Act specified a deadline for attainment, it did not require states to
demonstrate consistent progress toward that goal. Although states presum-
ably intended to comply, many attempted to do so while continuing to allow
the construction of new and modified pollution sources without requiring
the installation of necessary pollution control equipment." Thus, emissions
increased rather than decreased as states labored under the false hope that
large emission reductions could be achieved just prior to the Act's deadline.98
Instead, the continued economic growth resulted in nonattainment of the
standards. Moreover, under the Act nonattainment resulted in the halt of
further economic growth. 99
94. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(4) (1982). That section prohibits the construction or modification
of a polluting source if the change would prevent the attainment or maintenance of any air
quality standard. Id. Read strictly, this provision bans all construction subsequent to passage
of the attainment deadline because it would technically be impossible to attain the standards
after that date. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 208 (1977).
95. According to the chief sponsor of the Act, Senator Muskie, only 91 of the 247 air
quality control regions of the nation had met the air quality standards by the Act's deadline.
Additionally, 45 states were notified, subsequent to the deadline, that their implementation
plans were inadequate. 123 CoNC. REC. 18,015 (1977). The former head of the EPA, Russell
Train, found that states had not been able to meet the standards for a variety of reasons,
including both economic and enforcement problems. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
207-08 (1977).
96. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1977).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra note 94. To avoid this crippling ban and to provide temporary relief as
Congress battled to amend the Act, the EPA adopted the Emission Offset Interpretive Ruling
in 1976. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1976). The ruling allowed limited industrial growth in states
subject to the construction ban if two conditions were met. First, a new or modified polluting
source had to be constructed with the best available pollution control technology. Second, any
increased emissions from the source were to be offset by a greater reduction in emission from
another polluting source within the unhealthy air state. The EPA made it clear, however, that
the Act forbade economic considerations to outweigh the primary goal of protecting the public's
health. See id.
Many members of Congress were critical of the discriminatory effect the ruling had on new
companies. See S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 111-14 (1977) (view of Sen. Bentsen);
123 CONG. REC. 16,204 (1977) (comment of Rep. Waxman). The approach of the ruling was
also criticized because it made pollution a "marketable commodity" by rewarding polluters
who had resisted compliance and could later "sell" available emissions offsets to newcomers.
In addition, the ruling acted as a disincentive to modernization for polluters who opted to resist
compliance rather than be subjected to the ruling's strict requirements. Moreover, this approach
would be ineffective because it only applied to larger polluters. Many small polluters could
locate in an unhealthy air state and, although together their net emissions might exceed emission
standards, the polluters themselves would not be subject to the ruling's requirements. Finally,
since a large polluter could foreseeably buy up small polluters in order to obtain allowable
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Congress addressed the nonattainment problem in its 1977 amendments
to the Act.10o Although protection of the public's health remained the Act's
"overriding commitment,"'' 0 Congress recognized the need to balance the
environmental concern of ensuring steady improvement of air quality with
the conflicting economic concern of allowing reasonable economic growth.10 2
Thus, through the 1977 amendments, Congress redesigned the Act 03 to allow
growth in the states where national standards are exceeded and the public
health remains at risk. That growth, however, is limited so that the eventual
attainment of the national air standards is ensured.'0 4 To accomplish these
objectives, the amended Act subjects the proposed construction of new or
modified polluting sources within unhealthy air states to a stringent permit
program. 05 Additionally, construction of modifications in clean air states
remains subject to a less stringent permit program. 06 Under these programs
offsets, a potential monopoly situation could arise. See S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
1485 (1977) (view of Sen. Bentsen); 123 CONG. REC. 16,204 (1977) (comment of Rep. Waxman).
100. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1982)).
101. The Clean Air Conference Report stated that, although economic considerations are
to be taken into account, the overriding commitment of the 1977 Act is to the protection of
public health. 123 CONG. REC. 27,070 (1977).
102. By the late 1970's, the ideal of pollution-free economic growth had given way to the
realities of high unemployment, an economic recession, and the energy crisis. Congress amended
the Act in light of those realities, and specified the two main purposes of the provisions for
unhealthy air states as "(l)[the] allow[ance of] reasonable economic growth . . .while making
reasonable further progress to assure attainment of the standards by a fixed date; (2)[the]
allow[ance of] . . .greater flexibility." H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1977).
103. The Act provides that the Administrator is to "designate as an air quality control
region any interstate area or major intrastate area which he deems necessary or appropriate for
the attainment and maintenance of ambient air quality standards." 42 U.S.C. § 7407(c) (1982).
States therefore might be subdivided into one or more air quality control regions, with each
region classified accordingly. For purposes of this Note, however, each state is referred to as
a single air quality control region.
A "clean air state" is defined as having "air quality levels better than national primary or
secondary air quality standard[s]," or as a region for which there is insufficient data to classify
the air quality. Id. § 7470(d)(1)(D), (E). The Act refers to an unhealthy air state, or unhealthy
air region within a state, as a "nonattainment area." A nonattainment area is defined as one
which exceeds any air quality standard for any pollutant. Id. § 7501(2). Since a state is classified
based on its compliance with each standard, the state may be classified as both a clean air state
for purposes of one pollutant and an unhealthy air state for others.
104. The nonattainment provisions required an unhealthy air state to revise its implemen-
tation plan to "provide for attainment of each ...air quality standard ...as expeditiously
as practicable." Id. § 7502(a)(1).
105. See id. § 7503; see infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text. The Act's provisions
for unhealthy air states were designed to give states more flexibility in two ways: first, to chose
among available emissions offset combinations, and second, to reclassify regions within their
own borders. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1979).
106. The permit requirements for clean air states require the applicant to, among other
things, demonstrate that emissions from the proposed source will not create or significantly
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a permit must be acquired before construction of a new polluting source or
modification of an existing source can occur. 07
Intended both as a tool for attainment and as a means for continued
growth, the permit program is designed to consistently reduce emissions and
to force industry to develop and install the most effective pollution control
technology. 0 8 Thus, the permit program reflects Congress's intent to place
the burden of pollution control on the polluters themselves. 0 9 Additionally,
Congress intended the program to act as an incentive for existing polluters
to comply with the states' implementation plans, because a company resisting
compliance receives no permit and thus foregoes the opportunity to expand.10
A permit is issued only when four statutory requirements are met.", First,
the EPA must determine that the unhealthy air state has adopted an approved
plan for attaining national air standards and that the state is actually carrying
out its plan."12 Without an approved and working plan, no industrial growth
contribute to air pollution, and install the best available control technology on the source. See
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3), (4) (1982). The "best available control technology" means "an emission
limitation . . .which the permitting authority , . .taking into account energy, environmental
and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable through application of...
available [technology]. In no event shall application of 'best available technology' result in
emissions of any pollutants which will exceed the [national] emissions [standards]." Id. §
7479(3).
107. Id. § 7502(b)(6) (nonattainment); id. § 7410(a)(2)(b) (general).
108. In a Senate debate of the 1977 amendments, Senator Muskie made the following
remarks:
Concern has been expressed with the fact that the Clean Air Act does not permit
new sources of pollutants to locate in areas where ambient standards for those
pollutants are presently exceeded . . . .The committee position is-and the Clean
Air Act supports the argument-that so long as a new source will not "prevent
attainment or maintenance of standards, it can be located in a dirty air region ....
The benefit of forcing both best available technology on the sources and assured
compliance with applicable emissions limits.
122 CONG. REC. 25,877 (1976).
109. During the Senate consideration of the Conference Report, Senator Waxman stated
that, "[bly making it prohibitively expensive to engage in further delays, we have provided the
strongest incentive to recalcitrant polluters for them to clean up the air." 123 CONG. REC.
27,076 (1977). This is to be done by charging a penalty for those companies failing to comply,
at a rate which makes it equally expensive to resist compliance as it is to comply. He further
stated that, "[nlo longer will [industries] find it cheaper to send lawyers into court instead of
purchasing and installing necessary pollution control equipment." Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §
7420 (1982) (section providing for the assessment and collection of noncompliance penalty).
Polluters should be required to pay the cost for using the public's clean air. See D. CURRIE,
supra note 82, § 1.10. Currie suggests that the polluter may be required to pay for its use of
our air through the use of private lawsuits or through emissions charges or taxes. He concludes,
however, by finding that such lawsuits are ineffective and that an emission tax would most
likely be arbitrary and unenforceable. Id. Thus, the logical conclusion, despite its deficiencies,
is to resort to government regulation.
110. 123 CONG. REC. 18,018 (1977) (remarks of Act's sponsor, Sen. Muskie).
IIt. 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1982).
112. Id. § 7503(4). That section provides that one requirement for permit issuance is that
"the applicable implementation plan is being carried out for the nonattainment area in which
the proposed source is to be constructed or modified ... ." Id.
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is allowed in the state. The promise of growth is therefore intended to
provide an incentive for unhealthy air states to comply with the Act." 3
Second, the state agency must determine that increased emissions from
the proposed new or modified source will be offset by a reduction in emissions
elsewhere in the area.' 14 Reducing emissions is necessary to avoid a major
weakness of the 1970 Act." 5 Consistent reductions in emissions will allow
for steady progress toward the attainment of air quality standards. Thus,
the unhealthy air state will not be forced to make drastic emissions reductions
as the deadline for attainment under the 1977 amendments approaches." 6
Third, the applicant must bring all of its other noncomplying facilities
within the unhealthy air state into compliance with that state's plan." 7 This
requirement forces polluting companies to clean up facilities that are con-
tributing to the state's unhealthy air status prior to receiving the economic
reward of industrial expansion."'
113. Id. § 7413(a)(5). Existing industries wishing to expand and new industries wishing to
locate in that state will be forced to seek locations in other states, thus depriving the unhealthy
air state of needed economic expansion. One commentator asserts that this is unfair to
newcomers to the state. Simply because the state has failed to force existing companies to
comply, the new company is denied permission to construct. See D. CURRIE, supra note 82, §
6.10.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1) (1982). Before a permit is issued, the permitting agency must
determine that:
(1) by the time the source is to commence operation, total allowable emissions from
existing sources in the region, from new or modified sources which are not major
emitting facilities, and from the proposed source will be sufficiently less than total
emissions from existing sources allowed under the applicable implementation plan...
so as to represent . . . reasonable further progress . . . ; or
(2) that emissions of such pollutant resulting from the proposed new or modified
major stationary source will not cause or contribute to [exceeded] emissions levels.
Id. This offset policy is similar to the "bubble concept" discussed infra notes 132-34 and
accompanying text. The difference is that the bubble concept allows trade-offs between sources
within a facility, while the offset policy allows trade-offs between entire facilities. L. LAVE &
G. OMENN, supra note 89, at 23.
115. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
116. "Reasonable further progress" must be made towards reaching air quality standards.
Although the House sought to require progression in specific yearly increments, the conference
agreement determined that this term was intended to mean regular, consistent emissions reduc-
tion. See H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1977); 123 CONG. REC. 26,613 (1977).
Senator Muskie defined this term to mean that "further control to existing facilities, development
of further production process controls, and new innovative control techniques must be applied
on all sources." 123 CONG. REC. 18,019 (1977).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(3) (1982). This section provides that "the owner or operator of the
proposed new or modified source [must] demonstrate that all major stationary sources owned
or operated by [him] ... in such State are subject to emission limitations and are in compliance,
or on a schedule for compliance with all applicable emission limitation and standards.
Id.
118. This is one way of forcing compliance on those companies that have resisted compliance
in the past, but seek to expand facilities or build new facilities in the area. This requirement
may be "disproportionate to the offense," however, because the owner may not be intentionally
resisting compliance. It may be that the owner is unable to reasonably prevent the violation.
See D. CURRIE, supra note 82, § 6.10.
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Fourth, the applicant must ensure that the proposed new or modified
source will be equipped with the most effective pollution control technology
to obtain the lowest achievable emission rate.'' 9 That rate is defined as the
lower of either the lowest rate for that type of source in any state or the
lowest rate achieved in practice.' 0 Thus, the applicant is forced to develop
technology, when none exists, to achieve this rate.' 2 ' This concept, known
as technology-forcing, 2 places the burden of developing new technology on
industry, the group most responsible for polluting the air. More importantly,
it places the burden on those companies seeking to increase pollution in an
area where the public health remains at a risk.'
A permit is required prior to the construction or modification of a polluting
source in an unhealthy air state.' 24 An existing source is modified when it is
physically or operationally changed so that the change results in a pollution
increase.2 5 Whether there is a pollution increase, however, depends upon
119. 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2) (1982).
120. Id. § 7501(3). That section defines the term "lowest achievable emissions rate" as:
that rate of emissions which reflects-(a) the most stringent emission limitation
which is contained in the implementation plan of any State for such class or category
of source, unless the owner or operator of the proposed source demonstrates that
such limitations are not achievable, or (B) the most stringent emission limitation
which is achieved in practice by such class or category of source, whichever is more
stringent.
Id.
121. Id. § 7501(3).
122. Use of the term "technology-forcing" was intially seen in published materials and
cases in 1975. See Note, Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 YALE L.J.
1713, 1713 n.3 (1979); see, e.g., Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60,
75-77 (1975) (discussion of technology-forcing provisions in Clean Air Act).
123. In clarifying the purpose and intent of the 1977 Amendments, the Clean Air Act
Conference Report specified that "this year's legislation retains and even strengthens the
technology-forcing and technology encouraging goals of the 1970 Act." 123 CONG. REC. 27,070
(1977). In the Senate's consideration of the Conference Report, Senator Muskie commented
that the application of the best avialable control technology is a strategy that can best achieve
a reduction in gross national emissions. He also made clear the fact that those who use
environmental resources should bear the cost of protecting the environment. Id. at 18,016.
Under the Act, polluters are encouraged to develop superior technology through the EPA's
granting of conditional extensions. A facility may be granted an extension for compliance only
if it is currently developing or installing a means of emission limitation better than that which
is presently available. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4) (1982).
124. In developing its implementation plan, a state must "require permits for the construc-
tion and operation of new or modified major stationary sources." 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6)
(1982). While the provisions for unhealthy air states do not provide guidance as to the meaning
of the term "major stationary source" or "stationary source," § 7501(4) incorporates by
reference the definition for "modified" from § 741 l(a)(4) of the Act. See id. § 7501(4). Section
7411 (a)(4) defines a "modification" to be "any physical change in, or change in the method
or operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any pollutant emitted by
such source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted." Id.
§ 741 l(a)(4).
125. Id. § 7411(a)(4).
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whether the entire plant in which the modification occurs is considered the
''source," or whether the individual device that is modified is considered
the source.126 Thus, while a permit is clearly required prior to the construction
of any new polluting source, 27 it is unclear whether a permit is required for
all pollution-increasing modifications. 28 The coverage of the permit program
therefore depends upon the EPA's interpretation of the term source.
The term source has been interpreted in one of two ways. As an illustration,
take the case of a polluting company seeking to alter the method of operating
a furnace so that the furnace will emit an entirely new pollutant. First,
employing a broad interpretation of the term source, the furnace itself is
considered a pollution-emitting source. Because the furnace's modification
will increase pollution, it is subject to the permit program. 29 This means
that the company must assure that its entire plant, in addition to any other
facilities it owns in the state, are in compliance with the state's implemen-
tation plan. 30 The company must also install pollution control equipment
on the modified furnace allowing it to achieve the lowest possible emission
rate."'
The second and narrower interpretation of the term source, however,
subjects the proposed modification to the permit program only if the entire
plant, rather than the individual furnace, increases pollution. This interpre-
tation applies what is known as the "bubble concept" to the permit pro-
gram. 132 Under the bubble concept, the entire plant is treated as though it
is encased within a single "bubble." Pollution is therefore measured by the
total amount escaping from an imaginary hole at the top of the bubble.
Thus, under the bubble concept the polluting company can shut down a
non-productive furnace in an attempt to offset any increased pollution
resulting from a modification to a different furnace. If the resulting emissions
reduction is large enough to offset the increase from the furnace the company
intends to modify, the total pollution from the plant does not increase. The
126. See infra notes 135-58 and accompanying text.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982).
128. See id. §§ 7502(b)(6), 7411 (a)(4).
129. Assuming that the furnace is a major stationary source, its modification will subject
it to the permitting process because a "change in the method of [its] operation ... [will] result
in the emission of a [new] air pollutant." Id. § 7411(a)(4).
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(3) (1982).
131. Id. § 7503 (2).
132. One study defines the bubble concept as "an Environmental Protection Agency program
that permits choice within a plant of which specific pollution sources to abate, so long as the
overall emissions from the plant do not exceed the allowable limit." L. LAVE & G. OMENN,
supra note 89, at 50. The authors support the broad use of the bubble concept. They argue
for its adoption because it allows polluters flexibility to control emissions in the least costly
way to the polluters, while assuring that overall emissions do not increase. Id. But see Note,
The EPA's Bubble Concept After Alabama Power, 32 STAN. L. REv. 943 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Note, The Bubble Concept].
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company thus avoids the need for a permit.' 3 This means that the company
need not bring its other plants into compliance, nor install the most effective
pollution control equipment on the modified furnace. 3 4 The company is
allowed to modify the plant regardless of whether it owns four plants in the
unhealthy air state that violate every applicable emissions standard, or
whether this is its only plant and the plant is completely equipped with the
most modern pollution control technology. Applying the bubble concept,
there is no distinction between those complying and those resisting compli-
ance when an existing source is modified.
The Act and its history contain no reference to the applicability of the
bubble concept, or the plantwide interpretation. Indeed, the Act's only
specific guidance regarding this issue is found in the ambiguous definition
of the term "stationary source."' 35 A stationary source is defined as "any
building, structure, facility or installation" which emits pollution. 3 6 With
this limited guidance, Congress delegated to the EPA the task of determining
whether the bubble concept was appropriate in a given program under the
Act. Not suprisingly, the EPA has interpreted the definition of a "source"
differently for different types of programs, and each of these interpretations
has been promptly challenged in the courts. 3 '
133. If a change in a plant has no effect on emissions, it does not fall within the Act's
definition of a modification. Thus, only modifications which increase emissions or add new
pollutants, are subject to the permit requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(l) (1982).
134. This may be one reason why industry has so strongly supported application of the
bubble concept to the provisions for unhealthy air states. Although it may be burdensome to
go through the red tape of the permit program, the real burden to industry comes in the form
of forced compliance and technology-forcing. Had these industries complied with the Act's
original deadlines, however, they presumably would not be subject to this burdensome process
now because their states would have clean air.
135. A stationary source is defined under new source review in the general provisions of
the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (a)(3) (1982). While the Act's provisions for unhealthy air states
refer to the new source review provision to define a modification, there is no corresponding
reference for a stationary source or major stationary source. The Act's provisions for clean air
states similarlydo not define or refer to a definition for stationary source, however, a major
stationary source is defined within those provisions as "stationary sources with the potential
to emit 250 tons or more of any pollutant." Id. § 7491(g)(7). Presumably, the definitions are
applicable to all of the Act's provisions, although the obvious omissions almost appear to have
been intentional.
136. Id. § 7411 (a)(3).
137. See infra notes 138-58, 175 and accompanying text. The challenges take place pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1982), which provides in pertinent part, that "a petition for [judicial]
review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any nationally ... applicable regulations
...may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."
Id. The section further provides that "[any petition for review under this subsection shall be
filed within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears
in the Federal Register .... .. Id.
Congress provided for review of nationally applicable rules in a single court to allow a uniform
and efficient reviewing process. Review is appropriate in the court of appeals rather than the
19851 CHEVRON v. NRDC
The first application of the bubble concept to a permit program occurred
in 1976. That application involved a permit program that was designed to
improve air quality.' The EPA adopted a plantwide definition for the term
"source," thereby subjecting a proposed modification within a plant to the
permit program only if an emissions increase was not offset by a reduction
elsewhere within the plant. In defining a "source" for this program, however,
the EPA had essentially redrafted the statutory definition to include the
phrase, "any one or a combination of" facilities. 3 9
The Sierra Club challenged the EPA's interpretation in ASARCO Inc. v.
EPA, 40 claiming that the Act defined a "source" as an individual facility,
not as a combination of facilities. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit agreed with the Sierra Club and found that the EPA had
exceeded its statutory authority by rewriting the definition.'4' Moreover, the
court stated that the plantwide definition frustrated the purpose of the permit
program, which was to improve air quality, because that interpretation merely
maintained existing air quality. 42 The bubble concept was thus found to be
inappropriate. 141
district court because the appeals court takes no evidence, but merely reviews the agency's
rulemaking record. Id. § 7607(d)(7)(A). Within 60 days of a rule's promulgation, a petition
for review must be filed to timely determine the binding effect of the regulation. Id. Without
an early review, the rulemaking record and the agency's procedural defects become stale. Once
the 60 day period elapses, the unchallenged rule cannot later be judicially reviewed during
an enforcement proceeding. Id. § 7607(b)(2). This provision creates a potential problem,
however, because the regulation's future impact may be uncertain until its initial enforcement.
Thus, those potentially affected may not realize this fact until the 60 day period has long
since run. See R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS 56 (1981); Currie, Judicial Review Under
Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1221, 1258 (1977) (Currie asserts that the 60 day
requirement may be unconstitutional because those entering into a business affected by the
regulation but subsequent to the sixtieth day are precluded from asserting the invalidity of the
regulation).
138. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.2(d) (1976).
139. The EPA defined a stationary source to be "any building, structure, facility, or
installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant and which contains any one or a
combination of the following: I) Affected facilities. 2) Existing facilities. 3) Facilities of the
type for which no standards have been promulgated in this part." Id.
140. 578 F.2d 319, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
141. Id. at 327-29.
142. Id. at 327-28. The court reasoned that Congress had provided for new source review
after realizing that state implementation plans alone would not achieve air quality standards.
Id. at 327. These standards had to be met to achieve the goal of improving air quality and
new source review was a means for achieving that goal. Id. The means, however, were undercut
by the EPA's "applying the bubble concept [and] thus postpon[ing] the time when best
technology must be employed and at best maintain[ing] the present level of emissions." Id. at
328.
143. Id. at 327-29. In addition to finding that the EPA had no authority to rewrite a
statutory definition, in the majority opinion, Judge Wright also found the definition inconsistent
with Congress's intent to use new source review as a means for technology-forcing. See id. at
327. The court also noted that the EPA had agreed to this compromise with the nonferrous
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In 1978, the EPA again employed the bubble concept, this time in a
permit program for clean air states, that is, states that had attained national
air standards.' 44 Thus, the program was designed to maintain air quality
rather than improve it. This permit program for clean air states also contained
an EPA revision of the statutory definition of the term "source." The EPA
had added the words "equipment," "operation," and "or combination
thereof" to the definition. 45 When this interpretation was challenged in
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,'4 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit again found that the EPA lacked the authority to rewrite
the Act's definition and thus set aside the EPA's definition. Nevertheless,
relying on ASARCO, the court found that the EPA could interpret the
statutory definition of "source" to mean an entire plant. The court reasoned
that this interpretation was allowable because the permit program was only
designed to maintain air quality. Thus the court found that the EPA could
apply the bubble concept to a permit program designed to maintain existing
air quality.'14 Taken together, ASARCO and Alabama Power create a test
whereby it is appropriate to use the bubble concept in a program designed
to maintain air quality and inappropriate to use that concept in a program
intended to improve air quality.' 4
In 1980, the EPA issued a regulation adopting a dual definition for the
term "source."' 4 9 For purposes of the permit program for clean air states,
smelting industry only because failure to do so would result in "strong opposition from the
smelting industry and the Department of Commerce." Id. at 328 n.30.
Both the concurring opinion of Judge Leventhal and the concurring and dissenting opinion of
Judge MacKinnon, however, found that the EPA had the authority to interpret the term
stationary source flexibly. See id. at 330 (Leventhal, J., concurring); id. at 331-32 (MacKinnon,
J., concurring and dissenting). Judge MacKinnon specifically pointed out that the term "facility"
could refer to an entire industrial grouping. See id. at 333-34 (MacKinnon, J., concurring and
dissenting); see also R. MELNICK, supra note 137, at 296 (Melnick asserts that Judge Wright, the
author of the ASARCO opinion, consistently protects the public's right to a clean environment
as opposed to industry's right to avoid regulatory burdens).
144. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.24(b)(4), 52.21 (1978).
145. For purposes of the permit program for clean air states, the EPA defined a "source"
as "any structure, building, facility, equipment, installation or operation (or combination
thereof) which is located on one or more contiguous or adjacent properties and which is owned
and operated by the same person." Id. § 51.24(b)(4).
146. 636 F.2d 323, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
147. Id. The Court found that, although the EPA had no authority to add language to
the statutory definition, it did have discretion to interpret the statutory definition applying the
bubble concept, as long as the interpretation was "reasonable." Id.
148. Currie argues that these two cases failed to determine whether a plantwide definition
is appropriate for the term staticnary source as both cases merely dealt with the problem of
drafting. See D. CURRIE, supra note 82, § 3.05.
149. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1980). Although industry challenged the 1980 regulations in
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 80-1973 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 15, 1980), consolidated with
No. 79-1112 (D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 15, 1980), a settlement was reached in response to the
issuance of the 1981 regulation. See NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 724 n.28 (1983), rev'd
sub non. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
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the EPA interpreted the term "source" to mean an entire plant, thus
employing the bubble concept. For purposes of the permit program for
unhealthy air states, however, the EPA interpreted the term source to mean
both an entire plant and each installation within the plant, and thus the
bubble concept was not employed.
The EPA supported its use of the dual definition by relying on the test
developed by the courts of appeals in ASARCO and Alabama Power.,"" The
EPA found that because Congress designed the permit program for clean
air states to merely maintain existing air quality, the narrow plantwide
definition was appropriate. The EPA further found that because Congress
intended the permit program for unhealthy air states as a tool to improve
air quality, that program required use of the broader definition encompassing
both an entire plant and each installation within the plant. Significantly, the
EPA itself claimed that the interpretation was justified because the broad
coverage of the permit program in unhealthy air states was consistent with
Congress's intent.' 5 ' Congress had intended to accomplish the three goals of
reducing emissions, improving air quality, and technology-forcing in those
states. 5 2 Moreover, the EPA realized that the dual definition would com-
plicate the permitting process." 3 In some instances, a state might be an
unhealthy air state with respect to some pollutants and a clean air state with
respect to others, thereby subjecting a single modification emitting various
pollutants to one permit program and not the other."14 Nevertheless, the
EPA found the anticipated burden to be outweighed by the need for the
permit program's broad coverage in unhealthy air states."'
In response to President Reagan's order to reexamine regulatory burdens,"16
in 1981 Anne Gorsuch Burford, the new head of the EPA, proposed a
reversal of the EPA's 1980 regulation."' The EPA planned to reduce regu-
latory burdens and complexities by adopting a plantwide definition of the
term "source" for the permit programs under both the clean air states'
provisions and the unhealthy air states' provisions. Thus, in deciding to use
the broad definition for unhealthy air states the EPA reversed its 1980
decision. "1 8 While the notice of the proposed reversal specified that its primary
purpose was the reduction of regulatory burdens,"19 the final notice indicated
that the purpose for the reversal was to give states more flexibility in designing
their implementation plans as required by the Act. 60
150. See 45 Fed. Reg. 52,697 (1980).
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
153. See 45 Fed. Reg. 52,696-67 (1980).
154. See supra note 103.
155. 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1980).
156. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
157. See 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280-82 (1981).
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 50,767. In particular, the EPA concluded in its final notice of the proposed
regulation that two concerns warranted the plantwide definition:
19851
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The EPA advanced four reasons to justify its decision to reverse its 1980
position. 6' First, the EPA claimed that subjecting every modification to the
permit program acted as a disincentive to compliance. 62 Plant owners would
chose not to replace inefficient pollution control equipment with new ad-
vanced technology because the replacement would be subject to the permit
program. 63 The plantwide definition, the EPA claimed, would encourage
improvements in existing plants because many existing plant owners could
now avoid the permitting process.' 64
Second, the EPA stated that if the modification caused the plant as a
whole to significantly increase pollution, the modification would still be
subject to the permit program. 65 The EPA determined this to mean that
emissions would not, therefore, increase under the plantwide definition. 66
Third, the EPA concluded that the plantwide definition would reduce
regulatory burdens. 67 By simplifying the regulatory process and narrowing
the scope of the permit program's coverage, confusion and inconsistency
would be reduced. A modification to an existing plant would now be exempt
from both permit programs if the state were considered to be both a clean
First, today's action means that both the [provisions for clean air states] and [pro-
visions for unhealthy air states] will use the same definition of "source." This alone
will reduce regulatory conplexity. Sources will no longer have to figure out what an
"installation" is, which should lessen any confusion engendered by [the 1980 regu-
lation].
Second, and more important, by removing the requirement that states adopt a dual
definition, EPA is acting consistently with [the provisions for unhealthy air states]
of the Act. Congress expressly provided that states are to play the primary role in
pollution control . . . . It is also intended that states retain the maximum flexibility
to balance environmental and economic concerns in designing plans to clean up
[unhealthy air areas].
Id. (citations omitted).
161. See id. at 50,766-67.
162. Id. at 50,766. The EPA, however, failed to support this reason with any data except
to point to two potential situations which might arise, supplied by industry commentators. Id.
163. Id. at 50,767.
164. Id. at 50,768. The EPA pointed out that the plantwide definition was especially needed
in areas subject to the construction ban. In those areas, a proposed modernization would be
denied even though it would not increase air pollution. See id. The EPA failed to note, however,
that the plantwide definition does not apply to modernizations only, but to any modification.
See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. Arguably, the plantwide definition would not
actually encourage modernization at all.
States without approved and working implementation plans are subject to a construction ban.
These states therefore do not have the added safeguard of reasonable further progress towards
attainment that is required in an approved plan. The EPA's 1981 regulation allows construction
in states where none was intended. See infra text accompanying notes 323-24.
165. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766-69 (1981).
166. Id. at 50,767.
167. Id. at 50,766. The EPA set forth its reasons for originally adopting the plantwide
definition to be as follows:
[The] EPA adopted [the 1980 regulation] in order to most effectively use [new source
review] to aid in the clean up of [unhealthy air states] . . . [because] a narrower
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air state for some pollutants and an unhealthy air state for others. 68 More-
over, the regulatory burdens would be greatly reduced due to a significant
decrease in the coverage of the permitting process as a whole.169
Fourth, the EPA claimed that the plantwide definition provided the states
with more flexibility. 170 Although this would not relieve states of the Act's
requirement of reasonable further progress toward the Act's goals, 7' states
would be given the flexibility to either adopt or reject the plantwide defi-
nition, depending on the states' individual needs.17 1
Thus, under the 1981 regulation, an unhealthy air state is free to continue
largely unrestricted economic growth with the hope that it will ultimately
attain the standards by the Act's deadline. 73 Regardless of the state's choice,
however, the Act's deadlines will have to be met. 74 In short, the EPA
justified its regulation change by claiming that modernization was more
likely to occur, emissions would not increase, confusion and inconsistency
would be alleviated, and states would still be required to comply with the
Act. Based on this reasoning, the EPA reduced the broad coverage of the
permit program for unhealthy air states.
THE CHALLENGE TO THE 1981 REGULATION
Natural Resources Defense Council, Citizens for a Better Environment,
and North Western Ohio Lung Association promptly challenged the 1981
regulation. 75 In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 76 the Court
definition of source brings in more sources for review, which [would] enable states
to ensure more reduction in emissions ....
Id. The EPA then asserted that the 1981 regulation was necessary to "reduce these regulatory
burdens and complexities associated with [new source review]" by significantly reducing the
coverage of new source review. Id.
168. Id. at 50,767-78. The EPA reasoned that sources subject to the permitting process
under both sets of provisions would "no longer have to figure what an 'installation' is,
which should lessen . . . confusion." Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 50,768-69. The EPA argued that, although a state could adopt the plantwide
definition, the 1981 regulation did not forbid a state from subjecting all plant modifications to
the permit program. What the EPA failed to point out, however, was that a state would
generally not choose a definition that would put it at a disadvantage to its neighboring states.
Indeed, the Act itself has been amended many times to give the federal government increased
control after discovering that states were reluctant to, among other things, set strict air quality
standards. See supra note 85.
173. See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
174. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766-69 (1981).
175. The final notice of the proposed 1981 regulation provided that "under section [7607](b)(1)
of the Clean Air Act, judicial review may be sought only in the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Petitions for judicial review must be filed on
or before December 14, 1981." 46 Fed. Reg. 50771 (1981); see supra note 137.
176. 685 F.2d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the bubble
concept could not be used for a permit program in unhealthy air states,
because the purpose of the program was to improve air quality. In reaching
its conclusion, the court relied on the ASARCO-Alabama Power test. 7
Although the EPA asserted that the regulation was necessary to give the
states flexibility, the court dismissed that argument. The court found that
flexibility was not a goal of the Act, but only a possible means for achieving
the Act's goal of improving air quality. 7 8 Moreover, the court stated that
because the Act required states to submit proposed permit programs to the
federal government for approval, it seemed unlikely that Congress intended
states to then determine the applicability of the permit programs. 79 There-
fore, the court found that the EPA's 1981 regulation was arbitrary and
capricious. 8 '
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 8
the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and found that
the EPA's regulation was reasonable. The Court stated that the regulation
should be set aside only if it was "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute."' 2 This standard of review, the Court stated, required
an examination of the Act and its history to determine whether Congress
177. See 685 F.2d at 726-27. In a footnote, the court addressed and quickly dismissed the
EPA's contention that ASARCO and Alabama Power should be read to create a different test.
Id. at 726 n.38. The EPA asserted that the line should be drawn between programs that are
intended to be tech nology-forcing and those intended to reduce overall emissions. In ASARCO,
the use of the bubble concept was inappropriate ina technology-forcing program, and in Alabama
Power, use of the bubble concept was mandated in a program designed to reduce overall
emissions. Thus, the EPA claimed that because the provisions for unhealthy air states focus on
emissions reductions, the bubble concept was mandated. The court disagreed, however, finding
that the provisions are intended to be both technology-forcing and emissions-reducing. Id. at
726 n.38. Moreover, the court found that the EPA had based its analysis on an improper
reading of the cases. Id. at 727.
Arguably, the court decided ASARCO based upon an incorrect finding, as to the purpose of
the provisions for new source review. See D. CURRIE, supra note 82, § 3.05. The ASARCO
court failed to cite any materials which expressly indicated that enhancing air quality was the
purpose of these provisions and in fact the Senate Report states that the purpose was "the
elimination of new pollution problems." See id.
178. 685 F.2d at 725.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 727 n.41. The court, in footnote 41, also discussed the EPA's inconsistent
positions in 1980 and 1981. Id. The court noted that in 1980, the EPA had claimed that
providing broad coverage under the permit program was consistent with Congress's intent to
improve air quality. In contrast, the EPA claimed in 1981 that broad coverage slowed air
quality improvement by discouraging plant modernizations. The court did not find the EPA's
change in position justified by "any study, survey or support" in the record. The court stated
that because the EPA was required to explain why the 1980 regulation was no longer imple-
menting congressional policies, its decision "would not rise to the level of reasoned decision-
making" if based on this rationale. Id.
181. 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1984).
182. Id. at 2782.
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had any specific intent regarding the use of the bubble concept in the permit
program for unhealthy air states." 3 The Court, however, made no mention
of its duty to review the EPA's decisionmaking process. 84 Nevertheless,
finding an absence of congressional intent, the Court concluded that the
1981 regulation represented a reasonable policy choice. 85
The Court first discussed the formulas for proper review of an adminis-
trative agency regulation. The Court's initial inquiry was whether Congress
had expressed any intention regarding the precise question at issue.' 86 The
Court noted that if Congress had expressed no intention, a reviewing court
must then determine whether the agency's interpretation of the statute was
reasonable.'8 7 Furthermore, unless the agency's interpretation was arbitrary
and capricious, it must be given deference by a reviewing court.' 88 Addition-
ally, the Court stated that an agency's decision involving a technical and
complex policy question must not be set aside unless an examination of the
statute and its history reveal an intention contrary to the agency's interpre-
tation.'8 9 The Court found that the appellate court had therefore erred when,
in the absence of specific congressional intent, it imposed a judicial inter-
pretation on the EPA rather than determining whether the EPA's interpre-
tation was reasonable. 90
The Court next turned to an examination of both the Act and its history
to determine whether Congress had addressed the precise question at issue.
The only guidance the Court found in the Act itself for determining the
appropriateness of the bubble concept in this case was in the Act's general
definition of the term "stationary source."' 9' Looking to the legislative
history of what the Court referred to as a technical and complex Act, 92 the
183. Id. at 2783.
184. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
185. 104 S. Ct. at 2783.
186. Id. at 2781.
187. Id. at 2782.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2783.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2790-91. Although the provisions for unhealthy air states do not explicitly define
the term stationary source, the Court concluded that the definition for a stationary source in
the Act's general provisions for new source review could be employed. Id. at 2790-91 & n.32.
The Court also noted that the EPA had used the language of that definition in other regulations
regarding the permit program, despite the EPA's argument that the definition did not apply.
Id. at 2791 & n.32.
The Court was not persuaded by respondent's assertion that each word of the definition-
building, structure, facility, and installation-mandated the interpretation of source to mean a
separate device within a facility. Id. at 2790. Instead, the Court found that Congress's use of
these general terms was apparently intended to give the EPA flexibility in defining the term
stationary source for different programs under the Act. Id. at 2792.
192. Id. at 2791. The Court first referred to the Act as being "lengthy, detailed, technical,
complex, and comprehensive," id. at 2785, and then concluded that it lacked the expertise to
engage in a substantive review, id. at 2793.
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Court found that the Act's history was silent regarding the precise question
at issue. 93 The history did, however, reveal to the Court the two policy
concerns facing Congress when it enacted the statute. Without discussion,
the Court concluded that the 1981 regulation was consistent with the concern
of allowing reasonable economic growth. Moreover, the Court concluded
that the EPA's statements that the environmental concerns would also be
served by the regulation were supported by the EPA's reasoning. 94 To
support its conclusion that the environmental objectives of the Clean Air
Act were being served, the Court briefly noted that the rulemaking record
and certain private studies supported the EPA's explanation.'95
The Court then addressed, and quickly dismissed, respondents' argument
that the 1981 regulation should not be given deference due to its inconsistency
with prior regulations.19 ' The Court found that the EPA had always inter-
preted the term "stationary source" differently for different permit pro-
grams. The Court noted that such varied definitions supported the idea that
the statutory definition was intended to be flexible. 97 Moreover, the Court
stated that the agency must continually reevaluate its decisions based on wise
policy changes. 98 In any case, the Court added, the EPA's 1980 regulation
resulted primarily from the judicial creation of the ASARCO-Alabama Power
test rather than from the EPA's attempt to further congressional intent. 99
The Court then turned to a discussion of policy considerations. Stating
that the judiciary lacks the authority to balance competing policies,200 the
Court suggested four reasons that might explain why Congress left this
balancing to the EPA. Congress may have: (1) struck a balance, but failed
to do so with respect to this very specific issue; (2) intentionally left balancing
to EPA expertise; (3) failed to consider the issue; or (4) been unable to agree
on an acceptable balance. Regardless of Congress's intent, however, the
Court found the EPA's balance of economic and environmental concerns to
be reasonable. The EPA had reconciled conflicting policies under a technical
and complex Act and therefore, according to the Court, its decision was
entitled to deference. 0'
Significantly, the Court stated its general view regarding the policymaking
roles among the different governmental branches. The Court stated as a
193. Id. at 2792.
194. Id. at 2792. The Court expanded on this important point no more than to add two
short footnotes which provided no guidance as to the EPA's reasoning. See id. at 2792 nn. 36
& 37. Both footnotes in fact did not even support the EPA's reasoning that the Act was
intended to provide the states more flexibility because both footnotes spoke in terms of providing
the plant owners more flexibility. See id.
195. Id. at 2792.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2793.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2792.
200. Id. at 2793.
201. Id.
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general proposition that once Congress delegates its policymaking respon-
sibility to an agency, that agency may properly rely upon the President's
concept of wise policy in making its own decision. 20 2 Moreover, the Court
stated that the judiciary, which has no constituency, must not impose its
own policy views on an agency but must uphold reasonable policy choices
made by those accountable to the public. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld
the EPA's 1981 regulation as representing a reasonable policy choice. 20 1
ANALYSIS
The proper standard for reviewing the EPA's regulation change was the
arbitrary and capricious standard. 2°4 The Chevron Court's application of
that standard, however, ended with the Court's recitation of the words
"arbitrary and capricious." Apparently, the Court chose to ignore its recent,
well-reasoned State Farm opinion, 205 in much the same way that it had
allowed the EPA to ignore its recently reversed 1980 regulation. Had the
Court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard as set forth in State
Farm just twelve months earlier, the Chevron Court would have taken a
"hard look" at the EPA's justifications for its regulation change and
ultimately remanded the regulation for the EPA's reconsideration. Instead,
the Court adopted an approach that virtually exempted the EPA's decision-
making process from review. The Court relied on the mere recital of the
appropriate standard to summarily conclude that the EPA had provided
some reasoning to indicate that the regulation change would serve the Act's
environmental concerns as well as its economic concerns. 20 6
The words "arbitrary and capricious" are virtually meaningless until a
court applies them.20 7 Almost exactly one year prior to Chevron, Justice
White, writing for the majority in State Farm, gave meaning to those words.
Justice White began, as Justice Stevens had in Chevron, by reciting the
appropriate reviewing standard.20 8 The State Farm Court, however, did not
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Section 7607(d)(9) of the Act does not expressly provide for review of a regulation
regarding the requirements for state implementation plans. Congress, however, has expressed
no intention that such a regulation should be unreviewable. Indeed, the Court incorporated by
reference the standard articulated in § 7607(d)(9). See 104 S. Ct. at 2782. The Court stated
that the 1981 regulation was to be "given controlling weight unless [it] was arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id.; see also Currie, supra note 137, at 1221, 1238
(appellate courts have, without discussion, entertained challenges to implementation plans).
205. For a discussion of State Farm, see supra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
206. 104 S. Ct. at 2792.
207. Compare EDF v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (similar to Chevron in that
court merely recited standards but failed to apply them) with NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (similar to State Farm in that court gave the standard of review meaning in
its application). For an analysis of this comparison, see K. DAVIS, supra note 34, § 29.00-3, at
540-43 (Supp. 1982).
208. 103 S. Ct. at 2866-67.
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end there. Reflecting upon the purpose for reviewing an agency's decision
to change its rules, the State Farm Court found that an abrupt change in
the agency's policies may require even greater justification in the rulemaking
record.2 °9 Before examining the rulemaking record in State Farm, the Court
outlined three situations in which a reviewing court must find that an agency's
decision is arbitrary and capricious. An arbitrary and capricious decision is
one that is based on considerations other than those intended by Congress,
which overlooks a significant aspect of the problem, or is justified with
reasons contradictory to the evidence or completely implausible.2 "1 Moreover,
the Court declared that when an agency reverses a prior regulation, it is to
be presumed that the prior regulation would have been more effective in
carrying out Congress's intent. 2 ' Accordingly, the agency has a greater
burden in justifying a change in an existing regulation.
Similar situations faced the Court in both Chevron and State Farm. Both
involved informal rulemaking by an executive agency administering a statute
intended to protect the public-one public health, the other public safety. 2 2
Each agency had originally claimed that its rule was consistent with the
purposes of the statute under which the rule was promulgated. 213 The statutes
themselves are both technology-forcing in nature and were both enacted
because of the need to regulate industry. 2 4 Additionally, consistent with an
order from the then new Reagan Administration and followed by the Pres-
ident's appointment of a new administrator to each agency, both rules were
re-examined. 25 Finally, after re-examination, both agencies apparently con-
cluded that because industry had effectively avoided the existing rule, the
rule was no longer achieving its purpose. 216 Thus, both rules were changed-
209. Id. at 2866.
210. Id. at 2867.
211. Id. at 2866.
212. The purpose of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act is to reduce "traffic accidents and deaths
and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents." 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982). The purpose
of the Clean Air Act is to protect the public's health. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1982).
213. When the rescinded passive restraint standard in State Farm was first issued, NHTSA
claimed that requiring either airbags or seatbelts would save approximately 9,000 lives and
avoid an estimated 65,000 injuries per year. See 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289-99 (1977). Similarly, the
EPA had claimed that the broad coverage of the permit program was consistent with Congress's
intent to clean the air, reduce emissions, and force technology. See 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766-67
(1980).
214. Compare State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2871 (discussing the technology-forcing nature of
the MVSA) with Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 91 (1975) (discussing technology-forcing nature
of the Clean Air Act).
215. See Note, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, supra note 46, at 363 n.104; supra
notes 58-59, 156-60 and accompanying text.
216. NHTSA argued that because automobile manufacturers had opted for the less effective
alternative under the standard, the standard was no longer effective. See 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419
(1981); supra note 50. The EPA claimed that polluting companies would opt against modern-
ization rather than be subjected to the permit program. Thus, due to polluting industries'
avoidance of the permit program, the EPA decided that the regulation acted as a disincentive.
See 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1984).
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one modified, the other rescinded. 2 7 An important difference lies, however,
in the Court's review of each rule and in the results of that inconsistent
treatment. One rule was upheld and the other remanded for reconsidera-
tion. 21 
s
Reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard as employed in State
Farm, the EPA's decision to reverse its 1981 regulation would similarly have
been remanded for reconsideration. Using the State Farm approach, the
Chevron Court would have performed a close substantive review not of the
EPA's final choice, but of the EPA's decisionmaking process. The Chevron
Court, however, failed to discuss the EPA's decisionmaking process.
The EPA's initial decision to re-examine the 1980 regulation resulted from
the President's order to eliminate burdensome regulations. 2 9 After receiving
that order, the EPA decided to change the 1980 regulation to reduce regu-
latory burdens and to provide unhealthy air states with greater flexibility.
220
These justifications for the regulation change, standing alone, satisfied the
Chevron Court. 22' They would not, however, have survived review under the
State Farm approach. A careful review of the EPA's decisionmaking process
would have revealed that all three situations articulated in State Farm,22
which give rise to an arbitrary and capricious finding, were present in
Chevron.
Applying the State Farm approach, the Chevron Court would have found
that the EPA, in deciding to reverse its 1980 position, considered factors
other than those Congress intended to be considered. The purpose of the
statutory scheme for unhealthy air states is to allow the states reasonable
economic growth as they progress towards achieving healthy air status.2 23
The EPA is thus mandated to balance environmental and economic factors,
keeping in mind that the overriding commitment of the Act is the protection
of the public's health. 224 Similarly, the State Farm Court required NHTSA
to reconsider its balance of economic and safety concerns in light of the fact
that the Motor Vehicle Safety Act's primary goal is safety. 25
When necessary, the EPA is to balance environmental and economic
factors, giving special weight to the protection of the public health as the
Act requires.2 26 Here, however, the EPA's decision was based on the desire
to provide unhealthy air states with both regulatory relief and flexibility in
217. See 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981) (NHTSA's rescission of standard); 40 C.F.R. § 51.18
(1984) (EPA's modification of 1980 regulation).
218. Compare State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2874 (rescission of standard vacated) with Chevron,
104 S. Ct. at 2794 (modification of regulation unheld).
219. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 160.
221. See 104 S. Ct. at 2792.
222. See 103 S. Ct. at 2867.
223. See supra note 102.
224. See supra note 101.
225. 103 S. Ct. at 2873.
226. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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applying the permit program. 2 7 Neither the desire to allow polluting com-
panies to expand with greater ease, nor the desire to allow unhealthy air
states unrestricted economic growth, were factors that Congress intended the
EPA to consider if balancing became necessary. Arguably, Congress had
already struck a balance here by the very fact that it designed the permit
program. 28 With the permit program, unhealthy air states could have limited
economic growth. Without the program, there could be no growth in these
states. 229 But even if the EPA was required to balance in this situation, it
was not authorized to do so at the expense of considering the primary factor
that it was mandated to consider-protection of the public's health.
Indeed, it was because these unhealthy air states and the industries within
them had failed to comply with the 1970 Act that it became necessary for
Congress to amend the Act in 1977.230 In amending the Act, Congress
increased federal responsibility and control.2 3 ' Nevertheless, both of the
factors considered by the EPA favor reduced federal control and responsi-
bility and thus appear contrary to Congress's intent. As the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit correctly suggested, it seems unlikely
that the Act would require unhealthy air states to adopt a stringent permit
program and then turn around and allow those states to determine which
sources will be subject to the program. 2 2 Had the Chevron Court actually
reviewed the EPA's decisionmaking process, it would have found that the
EPA based its decision on factors other than those intended by Congress.
Thus, a close look under the State Farm approach would have revealed that
the EPA engaged in arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking.
Moreover, the Chevron Court would have found that the EPA engaged
in arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking under the second situation spec-
ified in State Farm. The EPA overlooked a significant aspect of the problem
when it failed to consider the effect that the 1980 regulation had on the
overall reduction of pollution.23 The EPA supported its regulation change
227. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
231. See id.
232. NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 727-28 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub norn. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). Two additional problems arise when allowing
unhealthy air states the flexibility to use the bubble concept in their implementation plans.
First, the EPA will inevitably approve a state plan to avoid political pressure because economic
expansion would cease if a plan were not approved. Second, in balancing the concern of
flexibility with that of reducing the risks to public health, flexibility must outweigh the risk to
allow the application of the bubble concept under the Act. The risks, however, are greater than
any benefits attained from increased flexibility. Thus, allowing unhealthy air states the use of
the bubble concept is inconsistent with the Act's primary goal of protecting the public's health.
See Note, The Bubble Concept, supra note 132, at 973.
233. Respondents asserted this argument relying on the State Farn opinion. Brief for
Respondents Natural Resources Defense Council at 44-47, Chevron, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
The Chevron Court, however, failed to address the argument.
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with the claim that pollution control progress was slowed under the 1980
regulation because that regulation discouraged companies from moderniz-
ing . 34 Even if this conclusory justification would have been acceptable
standing alone, it did not justify thwarting the broad coverage under the
1980 regulation.235 Congress thought long and hard to devise a method by
which pollution could be reduced while allowing continued economic growth. 3 6
The tool Congress designed for achieving these goals was the permit program;
the broad coverage of that program under the 1980 regulation was consistent
with Congress's intent.
The 1980 regulation allowed a polluting company to modify its existing
facility only if the polluter improved the overall air quality in two ways.
First, the 1980 regulation required the polluter to bring into compliance any
of its other plants within the state. 37 Second, it required the polluter to
install the most effective pollution control technology on its modified de-
vice.236 If such technology was unavailable yet feasible, its development was
required. 23 9 Through these requirements, the permit program was designed
to and, according to the EPA in 1980,240 could accomplish the goal of
reducing pollution overall. The EPA, however, failed to even address this
goal of the permit program in its re-examination of the 1980 regulation.
Under the 1981 regulation, consistent emissions reductions will not take
place because there has been a significant reduction in the coverage of the
permit program. Accordingly, the development of new technology is signif-
icantly reduced. Industries that allegedly found the permit program to be a
disincentive to modernization most certainly will not now voluntarily comply
with the program's technology-forcing requirement. Of course, the actual
234. 40 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1984). Although the EPA claimed that this regulatory burden acted
as a disincentive to modernization, it supplied no examples of a company deciding not to
expand based on this regulatory burden. The EPA's argument is similar to that of industry's
in opposing the permit program prior to the 1977 amendments. Industrys' arguments were
equally specious. According to Senator Muskie, the proposed new source review policy "was
greeted with a storm of protest from industry" claiming "such careful scrutiny" would make
it impossible to build new facilities. 123 CoNG. REC. 18,017-18 (1977). During the committee's
deliberations, it was informed of several large, job-creating, tax-generating projects that would
most certainly be killed by the stringent policy. Rather than kill these projects, however, the
policy had the specific effect which Congress intended. Existing companies in the areas improved
their own pollution controls in order to provide emissions offsets for the new projects, and
existing, previously uncontrolled emissions were "discovered" which, once controlled, also
provided offsets. See id.
235. See State Farm, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2869 (1983).
236. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
237. Under the 1980 regulation, the polluter seeking to modify would have been subject to
the permit requirements set forth in the provisions for unhealthy air states. Section 7503(3)
requires the polluter to bring all other sources into compliance prior to modification. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7503(3) (1982).
238. Id. § 7503(2).
239. Id. § 7501(3).
240. See 45 Fed. Reg. 52,697 (1980).
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determination of whether and how the bubble concept will affect the overall
reduction in pollution control is properly left to the expertise of the EPA.
2 4
'
Nevertheless, the Chevron Court should have at least required the EPA to
address this significant aspect of the problem. Thus, had the Chevron Court
applied the State Farm approach, it would have found that the EPA engaged
in arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking by failing to consider a significant
aspect of the problem.
The Chevron Court also would have found the EPA's decision to be
arbitrary and capricious under the third situation articulated in State Farm.
The EPA justified its decision with a reason contrary to the evidence. The
EPA claimed that requiring states to have approved implementation plans
was a sufficient safeguard to assure timely compliance with the Act.2 42
Requiring an approved plan, however, does not lead to the conclusion that
clean air standards will be timely met. Congress in fact designed the permit
program to prevent the reoccurrence of the nonattainment problem, which
arose because of a similar misconception.2 43 Prior to the 1977 amendments,
states had mistakenly allowed unlimited industrial expansion,- expecting to
significantly reduce emissions just prior to the deadline for compliance under
the Act. This false expectation resulted in noncompliance by a great many
states and forced Congress to develop specific provisions for unhealthy air
states.24 4 Included in these provisions is the very permit program to which
the 1981 regulation now applies. 241
The 1981 regulation raises the concern that unhealthy air states will again
fail to meet the Act's deadline, especially now that they are allowed increased
economic growth without a corresponding decrease in emissions. In address-
ing this concern, the EPA stated that an unhealthy air state must be given
the discretion to run the risk if it so chooses.2 46 The safeguard, according to
the EPA, is that the state must assure that it still plans to meet the Act's
deadline.2 47 The Chevron Court should have found that the EPA's short-
sighted reasoning contradicted the reality of the states' past actions and
Congress's intent to prevent that action from reoccurring.2 48 Thus, under the
State Farm approach, the Court would have found this reasoning to be
arbitrary and capricious.
241. See State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2872 (an agency must rely upon its own expertise in
determining feasibility of plans).
242. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,769 (1981).
243. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
245. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1982).
246. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (1981). The EPA stated that "[i]f a state wishes to use a plantwide
definition and run [this] risk . . . then the state has the discretion to do so ...... Id.
247. Id.
248. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying 'text.
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Had the Court correctly applied the arbitrary and capricious standard
employing the State Farm approach, one final step in the Court's review
would have been to note that the EPA's reasons for justifying its 1981
regulation contradicted its stand in 1980. In 1980, the EPA claimed that the
permit program's broad coverage was consistent with Congress's intent to
use the program to reduce emissions.2 49 The 1981 regulation, on the other
hand, exempts from the permit program many modifications that, if regu-
lated, would have provided reductions needed to meet Congress's intent.
According to the State Farm Court, an existing regulation is presumed to
carry out the policies of Congress.250 The Chevron Court should therefore
have required the EPA to reasonably explain its change in course. Because
the EPA failed to do so, the Chevron Court should have found the EPA's
decisionmaking to be arbitrary and capricious.
In summary, the Chevron Court clearly arrived at an incorrect result by
failing to examine the rulemaking record as required in State Farm. Had
the Chevron Court engaged in a meaningful review of the EPA's decision-
making process, it would have found that the EPA's decision was arbitrary
and capricious for each of the reasons articulated in State Farm. Instead,
the Chevron Court avoided any discussion of the EPA's decisionmaking
process by summarily concluding that the EPA's decision was reasonable.
Despite the similarities in these two cases, the Chevron Court did not
follow, nor even cite State Farm.25 ' This apparent inconsistency can be
resolved, however, by focusing not on the proper scope of judicial review
but on whether judicial review was in fact proper. The Chevron Court clearly
indicated its view of the proper separation of powers with regard to admin-
istrative agency policymaking. 52
The Supreme Court took the opportunity provided for it by Chevron to
express, for the first time in a majority opinion, its view regarding presidential
intervention into agency decisionmaking. The Court stated that, while Con-
gress has the first shot at determining policy when it enacts law, once
Congress decides to leave that responsibility to an executive agency the
249. 45 Fed. Reg. 52,697 (1980).
250. 103 S. Ct. at 2866.
251. Respondents argued that based on State Farm, the Chevron Court should find the
1981 regulation arbitrary and capricious because the EPA failed to consider an important aspect
of the problem, the regulation's aggregate effect on emissions. Brief for Respondents Natural
Resources Defense Council at 44-47, Chevron, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). Petitioners mentioned
the case only in a footnote in the Reply Brief. See Reply Brief for the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency at 16 n.22, Chevron, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). There petitioners
distinguished the case by claiming that the EPA, unlike NHTSA, had given a "full and reasoned
explanation" for its change. Reply Brief for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency at 16 n. 22, Chevron, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
252. 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
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President can intervene. 5 In addition, the Court stated that the federal
judiciary cannot review legitimate policy choices made by either the President
or Congress.25 4 Therefore, had the EPA alone made the policy choice chal-
lenged in Chevron, arguably the Court would have engaged in a "hard
look" review of the EPA's decision.
The Court, however, found that the EPA had not made the policy choice
involved with its 1980 regulation and intimated that the EPA did not make
the policy choice relating to its 1981 regulation change. 55 The 1980 regulation
was based on a policy decision that the Court found had been made by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 2 6 Indeed, the EPA
had indicated that it based its dual definition in the 1980 regulation on the
ASARCO-Alabama Power test. 257 Similarly, the Chevron Court noted that
the 1981 regulation change was based on Executive Order 12,291, which
embodies President Reagan's policy of deregulation.2"8
This is in contrast to NHTSA's decision in State Farm. Although NHTSA's
rescission of the passive restraint standard was based on a determination
that the standard's costs outweighed its safety benefits, NHTSA did not
specifically indicate that this cost-benefit analysis was performed pursuant
to Reagan's order. 59 The majority in State Farm noted that changing cir-
cumstances do not necessarily require deregulation. 20 Apparently the Court
recognized, but avoided discussing, possible presidential influence over
NHTSA's decision. 6' As one commentator has suggested, that Court may
also have been rejecting the deferential standard of review endorsed by
President Reagan in deciding instead to revive the "hard look" approach.2 12
The dissenters in State Farm, however clearly recognized the coincidence
of President Reagan's order to deregulate and NHTSA's corresponding
rescission of its regulation.2 63 Justice Rehnquist stated that a change in the
administration's policies would provide proper justification for an executive
agency to reevaluate its regulations. 2'4
Dealing with a regulation that was specifically changed in response to
President Reagan's order, however, the six Justices participating in Chevron
agreed that presidential intervention is proper when Congress has left a
policy gap. 26 5 This fact alone, however, still does not explain the Court's
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 2787-89.
256. Id. at 2789.
257. Id. at 2792; see supra notes 149-155 and accompanying text.
258. 104 S. Ct. at 2789.
259. See supra note 58.
260. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2871.
261. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
262. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 71, at 236.
263. 103 S. Ct. at 2871 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
264. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 2872 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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approach to judicial review in Chevron. The Chevron approach signifies
virtually no review at all. If the Court had determined that Congress had
struck a balance between competing policies, arguably the Court would
have performed the traditional review. Such a review would mean scru-
tinizing the EPA's rule-making record to ensure that the EPA engaged in
well-reasoned decision-making pursuant to Congress's balance.2" Deter-
mining instead that presidential policies were responsible for the regulation
change, however, the Chevron court completely avoided review of the
EPA's decisionmaking process. Although the Court indicated that the federal
judiciary was not to interfere in policy choices made by those responsible
for making such choices,267 the Court here was charged with reviewing the
EPA's decisionmaking process, not the policy choice of the President. 68
Arguably, therefore, the Court agreed with the President's policy. Had it
disagreed, as one commentator suggested in discussing State Farm," 9 the
Court merely had to review the EPA's decision, as discussed above, and
find that it was arbitrary and capricious.
The Chevron Court also justified its failure to review the decision by
claiming that the subject matter was too technical and complex for review. 270
The Supreme Court, however, tackled review of an equally, if not more
technical and complex, policy choice by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
in Baltimore Gas & Electric.27 Possibly, the Court decided to substantively
review the technical rule in Baltimore Gas & Electric not because the Court
felt itself more capable, but because of the Court's notice of the "acute"
public awareness of the issue of nuclear energy. 272 While air pollution was
also a topic of great public concern at one time, that concern has apparently
given way to what are now perceived as more imminent dangers. 273 This
relaxed public concern, combined with the President's influence over the
EPA's decision, might be the real factors that prompted the Chevron Court
to conclude that it lacked the expertise and authority to review the EPA's
technical policy choice. Indeed, as discussed above, if the Court had reviewed
the EPA's decisionmaking process, it would have found that the regulation
was arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, striking down the EPA's attempt
to ease regulations would have been inconsistent with President Reagan's
deregulation policy.
IMPACT
The Chevron decision raises three significant concerns in the field of
administrative law. First, although the Constitution vests Congress with
266. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
267. 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
268. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
269. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 71, at 237 n.54.
270. 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
271. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
272. See 103 S. Ct. at 2252.
273. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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lawmaking authority, it is now unclear how extensively that function may
be usurped once Congress has delegated its authority to an administrative
agency. Clearly, the Chevron Court would require an agency to abide by
specific congressional intent when the agency engages in decisionmaking
pursuant to a statute. 274 Thus, after Chevron, when Congress provides only
vague guidelines for agency action or delegates policymaking authority to
the agency, it runs the risk that its intent will be frustrated. In such a
situation, the agency may decide on its own whether furtherance of a given
policy is appropriate. One problem this creates is that broad policy decisions
affecting the general public are then being made by those who have no
constituency. 27 More importantly, such decisions may be immune from
challenge.
Judicial review of the agency's decisionmaking could provide an effective
safeguard to any abuse of an agency's delegated authority.27 6 Nevertheless,
after Chevron meaningful judicial review may not be guaranteed. Until
recently, Congress had its own, albeit imperfect, safeguard to check an
agency's decisions-the legislative veto. The legislative veto, however, has
been found unconstitutional. 277
Once Congress delegates policymaking authority to an agency, Chevron
allows the President to intervene in the agency's decision. 278 The President
may require the agency to consider policies other than those Congress
intended to be considered. Additionally, the President may require the agency
to balance congressional policy considerations in a different manner than
Congress intended. If the resulting decision did not actually conflict with
the underlying statute, that decision would be upheld under Chevron. Thus,
Chevron enables the President to effectively frustrate Congress's intent.
Congress can avoid this situation, however, by amending the statute that
gives the agency its policymaking authority. 279 In so amending the statute
Congress can make its intent clear by providing an agency with specific
guidelines and standards to use in the agency's decisionmaking.280 Although
it is difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to always foresee or agree on
potential policy issues, the attempt would prove worthwhile. By delegating
less policymaking authority to an agency, it is more likely that congressional
intent, along with the concern of accountability, will be served. Arguably,
however, this solution would be inefficient. It would return to the hands of
274. 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
275. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 25.
278. 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
279. See Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 215; Schoenbrod, supra note 16, at 826-28.
280. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (President's authority to act may depend on whether Congress has spoken); Verkuil,
supra note 20, at 950 n.41 (if Congress's intent is clear, President must respect it).
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Congress much of the workload that it had originally intended to spread
among administrative agencies.
To avoid the specific effects of Executive Order 12,291, Congress can
amend a statute, such as the Clean Air Act, to alter the status of the
rulemaking agency. An agency can be changed from an executive to an
independent agency.2 1' Although the order requires compliance by executive
agencies, consistent with the President's constitutional authority, it only
requests compliance from independent agencies.28 2 Thus, converting an ad-
ministrative agency into an independent agency insulates agency decision-
making from presidential influence.
The second concern that Chevron raises in the area of administrative law
involves the scope of presidential intervention into agency decisionmaking.
While the Chevron Court clearly endorsed the idea of presidential oversight
and input into agency decisionmaking,283 the extent of this oversight needs
further judicial clarification. Chevron did not specifically discuss Executive
Order 12,291. Although the general proposition of presidential intervention
into agency decisionmaking is proper, and even necessary 2 4 the scope of
Executive Order 12,291 may be improper.
A challenge to this order on the ground that it conflicts with an underlying
statute would most likely be fruitless. The order is effective only "to the
extent permitted by law. ' '2 5 Nevertheless, the order appears to conflict with
existing statutes both procedurally and substantively.
The procedures that an agency must follow during rulemaking are set
forth in both the Administrative Procedure Act and individual statutes.2 8 6
The Supreme Court, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,2s7
held that a court may not require an agency to adopt procedures in excess
of the statutory requirements. In contrast, Executive Order 12,291 imposes
additional rulemaking procedures on agencies, such as the requirement of a
cost-benefit analysis.2 8 Courts, however, have continued to require agencies
281. See K. DAvis, supra note 34, § 6:40, at 151 (Supp. 1982); Verkuil, supra note 20, at
964. Arguably, however, Congress intended to have the President control the EPA. Because
Congress knows that it can politically insulate an agency by making it independent, Congress's
failure to do so assumes Congress intended the present result. See Verkuil, supra note 20, at
964.
282. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
283. 104 S. Ct. at 2782.
284. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
285. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982); see
also Bagby, Regulatory Impact Analysis. Toward A Reasonable Economic Impact From Federal
Regulations, 19 NEW. ENO. L. REV. 533, 542-46 (1983) (reviewing court not likely to find order
improper); Raven-Hanses, Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Viola-
tions of Executive Order 12,291, 1983 DUKE L.J. 285, 307-11 (1983) (agencies may not be
bound to comply because order is not "law").
286. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
287. 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978).
288. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
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to follow additional procedures, despite Vermont Yankee, by categorizing
the additional requirements as substantive rather than procedural.2 9 Because
the force of Vermont Yankee has largely been diluted, it is unlikely that a
reviewing court would object to the order's additional imposition of proce-
dures.
The order substantively affects regulations by requiring agencies to justify
each major regulation with a cost-benefit analysis that places equal weight
on economic effects and the statute's intended goals. The statute that gives
the agency authority, however, may not require such an analysis. For ex-
ample, when NHTSA engaged in a cost-benefit analysis to justify its regu-
lation rescission, the State Farm Court found such an analysis inappropriate
under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 290 NHTSA was thus ordered to recon-
sider its balancing of costs and benefits in light of the fact that safety is the
primary goal of the Act.2 9' Earlier, in American Textile Manufacturers
Institute v. Donovan,2 92 the Supreme Court set aside a standard for cotton
dust in the workplace because the agency developing that standard had
improperly used the cost-benefit analysis. The Donovan Court found that
the agency could not engage in a cost-benefit analysis when Congress failed
to require such an analysis on the face of the statute.2 93 Perhaps the Court
would have found differently had the agency, in the absence of express
congressional authorization, relied upon presidential authorization to engage
in the cost-benefit analysis. Chevron arguably would support such a result.
Nevertheless, a cost-benefit analysis may be inappropriate when the ben-
efits that a statute is designed to achieve are largely immeasurable.294 The
Clean Air Act's regulations generally are designed to prevent or lessen
pollution.2 95 Benefits under the Act that cannot be measured include both
the negative benefits of the prevention of sickness, employee absenteeism,
and environmental damage, 296 and the positive financial benefits to the
manufacturer and installer of the pollution control equipment required by
the regulation. 297 Of course, extra costs will be imposed on those industries
with the least effective technology. 29 But overlooked in such a cost-benefit
289. See, e.g., State Farm, 103 S. Ct. at 2867.
290. Id. at 2871; see supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
291. 103 S. Ct. at 2871.
292. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
293. Id. at 510-11.
294. See Costle, Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Reform, 57 WASH. L. REV. 409,
412 (1982). Douglas Costle, former Administrator of the EPA, argues that policymakers are
mistakenly trying to provide regulatory relief, rather than much-needed regulatory reform. Id.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 415-16.
297. See Bagby, supra note 285, at 546 (argues that "all economic justification procedures
are inherently deregulatory").
298. See, e.g., EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 78 (1980) (discussing
expensive but cost-worthy compliance by industry with the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act).
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analysis is the fact that these short term costs are necessary in order to
achieve the Act's goal.2 99 Once the large initial expense of installing the most
effective equipment is undertaken and the Act's goal is met, the cost of the
regulation would be significantly reduced.
Additionally, a cost-benefit analysis is too subjective under statutes such
as the Clean Air Act.3°° For example, if the EPA chooses to impose strict
regulations on industry, it merely has to place a high value on protecting
public health. If the EPA chooses to provide regulatory relief, however, it
need only place a lesser value on that protection. The substance of a
regulation is therefore designed not so much to further the Act's goals, as
to further the President's policies.3 1'
Although the Chevron Court allowed the EPA to balance cost against
environmental benefits when it promulgated its 1981 regulation, it is unclear
whether the Court would allow this balancing in every situation. Viewing
Chevron in light of the Court's decisions in both State Farm and Donovan,
it may be proper for an agency to engage in a cost-benefit analysis only
when the underlying statute does not forbid such analysis and when the
agency engages in the analysis pursuant to an executive order. It is difficult
to determine, however, whether the Court's decision will rest upon these
two factors, or upon the Court's view of the appropriate result.
The third concern raised by Chevron involves the courts' role in overseeing
administrative agency decisionmaking. It is now uncertain whether meaning-
ful judicial review is required of every challenged regulation. The Chevron
Court determined that the EPA's decision had involved policymaking and
suggested that the EPA had relied on President Reagan's view of wise policy,
rather than its own, to make its decision.30 2 The Court then proceeded to
summarily conclude that the EPA's decision was reasonable. 03
The Court overlooked the purpose and scope of judicial review of agency
decisionmaking. The purpose of review is to insure that an agency has
engaged in reasonable decisionmaking.3 °4 Absent a careful judicial review,
unelected agency officials can make broad policy choices affecting millions
of citizens, without accountability. Apparently, accountability of the agency
was of little concern to the Chevron Court, because the Court implied that
the politically accountable executive branch had made the policy decision
for the EPA. 0 Thus, Chevron arguably stands for the proposition that
299. See id.
300. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1276 (suggests that factors in cost-benefit analysis
may be easily manipulated to result in the desired outcome).
301. See id.
302. 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
303. Id.
304. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
305. See 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
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judicial review of agency decisionmaking is unnecessary when elected officials
are actually responsible for an agency's policy choices. Review in such a
situation may even be improper after Chevron, because the Court stated that
federal judges must respect policy decisions made by elected officials.30 6
The proper scope of review, however, has never required a court to
substitute its own view for that of the agency30 7 as Chevron appears to
suggest.10 8 A court is merely required to review an agency's decisionmaking
process, not the agency's decision. This is done to determine whether the
agency's reasoning supports its policy choice, or whether that choice was
arbitrary and capricious.3 -9
Perhaps the Court avoided review of the EPA's decisionmaking process
in Chevron because, as discussed above, the EPA's reasoning did not in fact
support its policy choice. Possibly the EPA's choice was not supported in
the rulemaking record because the choice was actually made after that record
was closed and forwarded to the OMB pursuant to Executive Order 12,291.
Because facts and influences affecting a regulation as it passes through the
OMB need not be included in the rulemaking record, it might be difficult,
if not impossible, for a court to review the record and find that it supported
the agency's decision. 3 10 In such a case, the agency's rulemaking record
would only be a "fictional account" of the actual decisionmaking process
because of the ex parte contacts. 3 ' Review of the record therefore would
not be meaningful.
If this was the case in Chevron, the Court may have been expressing its
own policy choice favoring deregulation when it upheld a regulation with
apparently no rational support in the rulemaking record. The Court, how-
ever, expressed no view with respect to the propriety of ex parte contacts
and the restrictions they place on judicial review. Therefore, it may be that
the rulemaking record was accurate and that the Court simply favored
deregulation, or that the Court recognized the existence of outside influences
but declined to address them.
The Chevron Court, however, did attempt to justify its apparent failure
to engage in a meaningful review. The Court claimed that it lacked the
necessary expertise to review the regulation. 1 2 Nevertheless, a look at past
decisions reveals the Court's apparent ability to address other highly technical
issues. 3 This Court and lower courts have accomplished such technical
306. Id.
307. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
308. 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
309. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
310. See Verkuil, supra note 20, at 951 (court's role in review can only be fulfilled when
basis for agency decision is apparent); supra notes 37, 53-54 and accompanying text.
311. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 829 (1977).
312. 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
313. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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reviews by appropriately examining the agency's decisionmaking process, not
the agency's decision. If Chevron does stand for the proposition that courts
need not review technical decisions, however, Congress must take steps to
provide either an alternative method of review or an alternative to agency
decisionmaking. Commentators have suggested the development of regula-
tions through agency-industry negotiation,3' 4 the review of agency decision-
making by an administrative review board, 3 5 and the use of scientific law
clerks to aid federal judges. 31 6 Another solution could be the development
of a specialty court.
A special environmental court would possess the expertise necessary to
conduct a thorough review of technical and complex regulations like the
regulation challenged in Chevron. Congress could create a specialized court
in one of two ways. First, it could create an article III court, with the
requisite protections of salary and tenure for the court's judges. 317 Creation
of an article III court for environmental issues is unlikely, however, given
that Congress considered, but rejected, such a proposition when it recently
established the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 3t8
Congress declined to give that new court subject matter jurisdiction over
environmental cases.3"9 A second option is for Congress to create a legislative,
314. See Stewart, supra note 52, at 84-86 (weighs pros and cons of approaching rulemaking
through negotiation).
315. See id. at 83-84.
316. See B. ACKERMAN, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 147-61
(1974).
317. See U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 1. Article III provides that the "judicial Power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." Id. Article III judges "shall hold their offices
during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in office." Id.
318. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
319. A proposal by the Department of Justice recommended the establishment of a national
court to hear civil tax, patent, and environmental appeals. See OFFICE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE THE FEDERAL APPELLATE
SYSTEM (July 21, 1978) (draft report); accord Leventhal, A Modest Proposal for a Multi-Circuit
Court of Appeals, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 881 (1975) (Judge Leventhal, of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, proposed a national court of appeals with subject matter
jurisdiction over tax, labor, environmental, patent, and securities law cases). The final bill
adopted, however, substantially limited the subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982) (Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit given jurisdiction
over all patent appeals and government claims). For statements of senators concerned with
setting a precedent for the establishment of specialty courts, see S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong.,
ist Sess. 39 (1981) (view of Sen. Leahy) ("would be very detrimental to our tradition of
diversity and independence of the bench"), and S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 40
(1981) (view of Sen. Baucus) ("will lead to a proliferation of Federal specialty courts"). See
generally Petrowitz, Federal Courts Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982-
And Beyond, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 543 (1983) (comprehensive review of development of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
Although Congress appears to be opposed to the idea, arguably it has already "created" an
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or article 1, court. Such a court could be created pursuant to Congress's
"necessary and proper" powers found in article 1.320 If Congress should
choose to create an article I court, however, it must take care to avoid
vesting that court with all the powers of an article III court because such a
delegation of authority will inevitably be found unconstitutional.3 2
It is unlikely that Chevron stands for the proposition that courts may no
longer engage in meaningful judicial review under all circumstances. State
Farm had been applauded by many as a revival of the "hard look" approach
to review.3 22 While Chevron represents a retreat from this position, it clearly
does not overrule State Farm. Arguably, courts will continue to employ the
"hard look" approach except where, as in Chevron, the court finds that a
politically accountable body, and not the agency, is responsible for the policy
choice.
Not to be overlooked is the impact that Chevron may have on the
environment and public health. Chevron undercuts the overriding commit-
ment of the Clean Air Act. That commitment, to protect public health,
3 23
was pushed aside in order to exempt polluters from permit requirements for
the sake of regulatory relief and flexibility. Moreover, the 1981 regulation
uses the bubble concept to allow existing polluters to avoid reducing pollution
overall.
article III specialty court to hear environmental cases. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1982),
a petition for review of many discretionary actions by the EPA may be filed only in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See supra note 175. Not only does this
provision provide national uniformity in decisions regarding the Clean Air Act, but it also
allows the District of Columbia Circuit judges to develop expertise in environmental matters.
320. See U.S. CONST. art. I. Congress relies on its powers enumerated in Article I, along
with the necessary and proper clause, to create legislative courts. There are currently three types
of legislative courts: (I) The Tax Court, See 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1982); (2) the United States
Court of Military Appeals, see 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1982); and, (3) the Claims Courts, see 28
U.S.C. § 171(a) (1982). A legislative court functions as an "adjunct" to article Ill courts. See
Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2875 (1982). For
a discussion of special courts in general, see L. REDDEN, FEDERAL SPECIAL COURT LITIGATION
(1982).
A fourth type of legislative court, the Bankruptcy Court, was recently found to be unconsti-
tutional because it was vested with all the powers of article Ill courts. Northern Pipeline, 102
S. Ct. at 2858. For a detailed analysis of the Northern Pipeline decision and suggestions
for allocations of judicial power, see Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197. See also King, The Unmaking of a
Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath of Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99
(1983) (comprehensive history of bankruptcy courts).
321. For example, the article I Claims Court now replaces the former article II1 Court of
Claims, pursuant to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96
Stat. 25 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1982)). Commentators suggest, however, that the new
Claims Court may be found unconstitutional based upon the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Northern Pipeline. See Baker, Is the United States Claims Court Constitutional?, 32 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 55 (1983); Swennen & Weich, The Constitutionality of the New Claims Court, 29
FED. B. NEWS & J. 477 (1982).
322. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 71.
323. See supra note 83.
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Take, for example, a polluting company that owns four plants in an
unhealthy air state. The polluter has resisted compliance up to this point,
thereby helping to place the state in the unhealthy air category. Although
the polluter wanted to tear down an old plant and replace it with a new
one, it had previously decided against this choice. The permit program's
requirement to first bring the polluter's other three plants into compliance
would have been costly. Under the bubble concept, however, the polluter
may now simply replace the old plant, piece by piece. Unless emissions
increase overall, the 1981 regulation will not subject these replacements to
the permit program. Thus, no emissions reductions will occur and the
polluter's other three plants can and will remain in noncompliance. Addi-
tionally, the polluter can and will continue to avoid investing in the devel-
opment and installation of advanced pollution control technology. Absent
these reductions in emissions and the development of improved technology,
progress toward reaching the clean air standards will be brought to a
standstill. Without obtaining clean air standards, public health remains at
risk.3 24 Thus, the Chevron Court's decision will have the practical result of
substantially injuring the public's health. Moreover, this result is totally
contradictory to Congress's intent underlying the Clean Air Act.
CONCLUSION
Chevron represents a rare occasion in which the United States Supreme
Court has spoken regarding its view of presidential power. The Supreme
Court clearly endorsed the notion of presidential intervention into agency
decisionmaking. While explicit congressional directives must be adhered to
when Congress delegates policymaking authority to an agency, under Chev-
ron that delegation may be properly usurped by the President.
Once the President intervenes in an agency's decisionmaking, the availa-
bility and the extent of judicial review of the decision are unclear. Although
Chevron represents a significant retreat from the "hard look" approach
recently articulated in State Farm, courts are unlikely to completely avoid
review in all cases of presidential intervention. One can only speculate,
however, on the unspoken factors which will influence the courts' decision
to avoid a meaningful review.
In Chevron, the Court's failure to meaningfully review the agency's de-
cision resulted in frustration of the congressional intent to protect the public
health. Thus, a court that favors presidential policy may choose to frustrate
congressional policies by applying the Chevron approach in cases in which
the President has influenced the agency's decision. With courts allowing
agency decisionmaking to thereby go unchecked, one can only hope that the
policy views the agency relied upon are truly those of the President and not
those of private industry.
Susan J. Flieder
324. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
19851

